Paramours, Promotions, and Sexual Favoritism: Unfair, but is There Liability? by Poole, Mitchell
Pepperdine Law Review
Volume 25 | Issue 4 Article 3
5-15-1998
Paramours, Promotions, and Sexual Favoritism:
Unfair, but is There Liability?
Mitchell Poole
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/plr
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, Labor and Employment Law Commons,
and the Women Commons
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at Pepperdine Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Pepperdine Law Review by an authorized administrator of Pepperdine Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
Kevin.Miller3@pepperdine.edu.
Recommended Citation
Mitchell Poole Paramours, Promotions, and Sexual Favoritism: Unfair, but is There Liability?, 25 Pepp. L. Rev. 4 (1998)
Available at: http://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/plr/vol25/iss4/3
Paramours, Promotions, and Sexual Favoritism:
Unfair, but is There Liability?
I. INTRODUCTION
Sex discrimination issues were on the collective mind of the Supreme
Court during the 1998 term.' The Court, however, left unanswered the
question of whether sexual favoritism2 is an unlawful form of sex dis-
crimination.' This Comment raises the question again.
1. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 118 S. Ct. 998, 1003 (1998)
(holding that "sex discrimination consisting" of same-sex sexual harassment is action-
able under Title VII"); Jansen v. Packaging Corp. of Am., 123 F.3d 490 (7th Cir. 1997)
(en banc), cert. granted sub nom., Burlington Indus., Inc., 118 S. Ct. 876 (Jan. 23,
1998) (97-569) (granting certiorari to determine whether a subordinate must prove an
actual job detriment after refusing a supervisor sexual advances or demands in order
have a valid Title VII sexual harassment claim under a quid pro quo theory);
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 111 F.3d 1530 (11th Cir.), cert. granted, 118 S. Ct.
438 (Nov. 14, 1997) (No. 97-282) (granting certiorari to determine when employers are
liable for a supervisor's sexual harassment of his subordinates); Doe v. Lago Vista
Indep. Sch. Dist., 106 F.3d 1223 (5th Cir.), cert. granted, 118 S. Ct. 595 (Dec. 5, 1997)
(No. 96-1866) (granting certiorari to determine whether public schools can be held
liable for a teacher's sexual harassment of a student under the antidiscrimination
provisions of Title IX).
2. This Comment defines sexual favoritism as a situation where a consensual
romantic relationship between a supervisor and a subordinate results in otherwise
undeserved benefits for the subordinate. See DeCintio v. Westchester County Med.
Ctr., 807 F.2d 304, 308 (2d Cir. 1986) (discussing this definition of sexual favoritism
but holding it is not actionable under Title VII). In turn, a consensual romantic rela-
tionship is one where adults enter the relationship freely and for reasons other than
a quid pro quo exchange of romance for employment benefits. See id. (discussing
that the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) indicated that voluntary
sexual relations between co-workers are not "subject to Title VII scrutiny, so long as
they are personal, social relationships"). That people are suspicious of such sexual
favoritism cases is inherent in the alternate title sometimes used for them-"'reverse
quid pro quo'" cases. See Piech v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 841 F. Supp. 825, 828
(N.D. M. 1994) (discussing the failure of other courts to recognize reverse quid pro
quo cases and itself rejecting such a claim). The implication is that the subordinate
is using sex to gain advancement, not that the supervisor is secretly demanding sex
as precondition to advancement. See id. Of course, the actual intent of either person
in the relationship may be difficult to evaluate, or the nature of a consensual rela-
tionship may turn quid pro quo over time at the direction of either party. See infra
note 306 and accompanying text.
3. In 1987, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in a landmark sexual favoritism
Presumably, most people believe that getting a job or a promotion
should be based upon unbiased evaluations of an applicant's work-relat-
ed skills, not upon a scoring system tied to sexual performance. With
that premise in mind, the United States Supreme Court has held that
sexual harassment is one form of unlawful sex discrimination.4 Still, it
is not always easy for courts or employers to tell what sex-related con-
duct in the workplace is deemed illegal harassment or discrimination.
For example, which of the following scenarios is unfair, discriminatory,
or harassing and also creates a legal cause of action?
(A) A supervisor demands sex from a subordinate as a precondi-
tion to giving the subordinate a promotion.
(B) A supervisor propositions numerous subordinates and quickly
promotes the one who acquiesces.
(C) A supervisor and a subordinate engage in a consensual ro-
mantic relationship. Thereafter, the supervisor promotes the subordi-
nate even though many other subordinates are better qualified.
(D) Same facts as (C), but shortly after getting the promotion, the
subordinate ends the affair. As a result, the supervisor retaliates by
claiming, accurately, that the subordinate is unqualified for the position
and demotes her.5
case. See DeCintio, 807 F.2d at 308 (holding that sexual favoritism was not action-
able under Title VII), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 825 (1987). DeCintio directly addressed
what the parties and court in King v. Palmer, 778 F.2d 878 (D.C. Cir. 1985), left
unchallenged: whether sexual favoritism is a viable cause of action under Title VII.
See id. In 1997, the Court again refused to grant certiorari in another case that
raised the issue of sexual favoritism. See Becerra v. Dalton, 94 F.3d 145 (4th Cir.
1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1087 (1997). In Becerra, a male employee claimed that
a female co-worker obtained a promotion because she was the paramour of two
supervisors who used their influence to secure a promotion for their paramour. See
id. at 14647, 150.
4. See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65-66 (1986); infra notes 77-88
and accompanying text (discussing Meritor).
5. The feminine pronoun is used only to reflect the most common reported situa-
tion-the subordinate being female. See Michael J. Phillips, The Dubious Title VII
Cause of Action for Sexual Favoritism, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 547, 549 & n.7
(1994). Although dated, one study from the late 1970s found that of all office ro-
mances, 74% "involved 'a male in a higher-level position than his female counterpart."
Joan E. Van Tol, Eros Gone Awry: Liability Under Title VII for Workplace Sexual
Favoritism, 13 INDUS. REL. L.J. 153, 162 n.39 (1991) (quoting Robert E. Quinn, Coping
With Cupid: The Formation, Impact, and Management of Romantic Relationships in
Organizations, 22 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 30, 34 (March 1977), reprinted in SEXUALITY IN
ORGANIZATIONS: ROMANTIC AND COERCIVE BEHAVIORS 38, 42 (Dall Am Neugarten & Jay
M. Sharfritz eds., 1980)).
Sexual harassment, favoritism, and discrimination cases, however, are not limited
to male supervisors and female subordinates. See, e.g., Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1003
(where male-on-male sexual harassment occurred); EEOC v. Domino's Pizza, Inc., 909
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In each of the examples above, the employees propositioned or
passed over for promotion can readily identify the unfair and discrin-
natory acts which injured them. However, a viable legal action against
the supervisor or the employer does not necessarily follow in each
case.' Many federal and state courts hold that sexual favoritism is un-
F. Supp. 1529, 1533-34 (M.D. Fla. 1995) (where a female supervisor repeatedly sexu-
ally accosted a male subordinate), affd, 113 F.3d 1249 (11th Cir. 1997); Ryczek v.
Guest Servs., 877 F. Supp. 754, 756-57 (D.D.C. 1995) (where a female claimed that
another female sexually harassed her).
6. Scenario (A) is sex discrimination under Title VII. The Supreme Court ratified
this principle in Meritor when it upheld the validity of sexual harassment claims as a
form of unlawful sex discrimination. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65-66. The EEOC made
such behavior a definitive example of unlawful quid pro quo sexual harassment. See
29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(1) (1997).
Most courts recognize that scenario (B) raises a valid sexual harassment claim
under Title VII. See, e.g., Dirksen v. City of Springfield, 842 F. Supp. 1117, 1122 (C.D.
111. 1994) (holding that a female employee has a valid sexual harassment claim when
she rejects a supervisor's quid pro quo sexual advances and is replaced by another
employee who was sexually involved with the supervisor); Priest v. Rotary, 634 F.
Supp. 571, 579-82 (N.D. Cal. 1986) (holding that a supervisor's preferential treatment
of the female waitresses who submitted to his sexual advances while harassing, reas-
signing, and terminating other waitresses who did not submit was ample evidence for
a Title VII violation). The employees who either refused the sexual advances or were
passed over for promotion have standing to sue in these situations. See, e.g., Dirksen,
842 F. Supp. at 1122; Priest, 634 F. Supp. at 579-82. In general, an employee who is
not directly propositioned can claim that an implied quid pro quo relationship exists
if other employees are all propositioned and the willing employee(s) ends up with
otherwise unwarranted benefits. See Phillips, supra note 5, at 554.
Courts have reached mixed conclusions in scenario (D) cases. The demotion
may not be actionable. See Dockter v. Rudolf Wolff Futures, Inc., 913 F.2d 456, 458-
62 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding that despite some sexual harassment by a supervisor, the
supervisor's termination of an incompetent subordinate, whom he initially hired to a
position beyond her capacity because of his romantic interest in her, was not action-
able under Title VII as a retaliatory termination even though the termination appeared
to be based upon the employee's refusal to engage in an intimate sexual relationship
after being hired).
Scenario (C) is the primary focus of this Comment. Since 1990, the EEOC has
recommended that this scenario not be considered discrimination under Title VII. See
Michael W. Casey, III & Richard D. Tuschman, Sexual Favoritism in the Workplace,
FLA. B.J., July-Aug. 1994, at 53 (citing EEOC Policy Guidance on Employer Liability
Under Title VII for Sexual Favoritism, EEOC Notice No. 915-048 (Jan. 12, 1990)
[hereinafter EEOC Notice No. 915-048]). The EEOC claims that sexual "'favoritism
toward a "paramour" ...may be unfair,'" but it is not actionable. Id. (quoting EEOC
Notice No. 915-048). Most courts have been willing to follow this policy rule. See
infra notes 183-88 and accompanying text (discussing the circuit courts' positions
regarding favoritism).
fair, arbitrary, and discriminatory in nature, but seldom rises to an ac-
tionable tort.7
These holdings are inconsistent with most people's understanding of
what equality in the workplace should be. Indeed, one common legal
definition of discrimination is "[a] failure to treat all persons equally
where no reasonable distinction can be found between those favored
and those not favored."8 Granting job benefits based upon an appli-
cant's commitment to a sexual relationship with the employer is a ques-
tionable distinction or criterion upon which to base any job or promo-
tion.' Yet, voluntary trading in sexual currency is for the most part
accepted by the courts and the Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission (EEOC). ° In most cases, only when sexual favoritism qualifies
as a more overt form of sexual harassment is a cause of action recog-
nized."
Cases of sexual harassment actionable under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964,12 however, are not always so easy to distinguish
from nonactionable cases of sexual favoritism, and employers are at
risk because of this vagary. Once liability does attach to a supervisor's
sex-related conduct, the employer can be held liable. 3 Therefore, em-
ployers have a lot at stake when developing workplace policies regard-
ing dating in the workplace, especially dating between supervisors and
subordinates.
Although few legal scholars have studied the issue, most favor recog-
nition of sexual favoritism claims or at least acknowledge the harms
sexual favoritism causes.14 Recognizing sexual favoritism as a cause of
7. See, e.g., Platner v. Cash & Thomas Contractors, Inc., 908 F.2d 902, 905 (11th
Cir. 1990); DeCintio, 807 F.2d at 307-08; Proksel v. Gattis, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 322, 324
(Ct. App. 1996).
8. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 323 (6th ed. abridged 1991).
9. A legal, if not layman's, definition of reasonable is "[flair, proper, just, mod-
erate, suitable under the circumstances." See id. at 874.
10. See infra notes 157-72, 183-88 and accompanying text (discussing the courts'
and the EEOC's views on sexual favoritism).
11. See infra notes 157-72 and accompanying text (discussing when sexual favorit-
ism is actionable).
12. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1994).
13. See infra notes 306-33 and accompanying text (discussing employer liability for
sexual favoritism and harassment claims).
14. See MACK A. PLAYER, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAw § 5.25(d)(2), at 251
(1988) (concluding that sexual favoritism should be a valid cause of action); Casey &
Tuschman, supra note 6, at 55 (recognizing the "technically 'legal' aspect of sexual
favoritism but counseling employers to avoid it); Phillips, supra note 5, at 596-97
(concluding that Title VII does not include "victims" of sexual favoritism); Van Tol,
supra note 5, at 156 (arguing that sexual favoritism is "a distinct type of sexual ha-
rassment actionable under Title VII" although it is not recognized as such yet); Mi-
chael J. Levy, Note, Sex, Promotions, and Title VII: Why Sexual Favoritism Is Not
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action, however, does have its pitfalls. This Comment explores the cur-
rent legal boundaries of sexual favoritism and the problems these
boundaries pose for plaintiffs and employers. Part II introduces the
federal sex antidiscrimination statute, Title VII, and a few parallel state
laws.' Part I1 discusses the theory through which the Supreme Court
of the United States and the EEOC came to recognize sexual harass-
ment as an invalid form of sex discrimination." Part IV traces the
courts' and the EEOC's evolving position on sexual favoritism as an
actionable form of discrimination. Part V reviews the various theories
and rationales as to why sexual favoritism is or is not a valid cause of
action.' Part VI recommends a framework for recognizing sexual fa-
voritism as an actionable form of sex discrimination under Title VI. 9
Part VII discusses employer liability for sexual favoritism and harass-
ment claims and recommends ways to avoid such exposure." Finally,
Part VIII concludes that, despite the potential problems associated with
sexual favoritism claims, there is sufficient room in both statutory lan-
guage and Supreme Court precedent to recognize sexual favoritism for
what it is-improper and actionable discriminatory behavior.2 '
II. TITLE VII AND PARALLEL STATE LAWS
A variety of laws and legal theories have fostered sex discrimination
and sexual favoritism claims.22 Title VII and its state law counterparts,
Sexual Discrimination, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 667, 670 (1994) (stating that his commen-
tary's purpose "is not to refute that instances of sexual favoritism have a negative
impact on the workplace," but to argue that sexual favoritism is not prohibited by
Title VII); Mary C. Manemann, Comment, The Meaning of "Sex" in Title VII: Is Fa-
voring an Employee Lover a Violation of the Act?, 83 Nw. U. L. REV. 612, 663 (1989)
(concluding that despite recent case law to the contrary, sexual favoritism should be
a valid cause of action under Title VII).
15. See infra notes 22-65 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 66-96 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 97-188 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 189-290 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 291-305 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 306-33 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 33440 and accompanying text.
22. When the employers are public entities, plaintiffs can bring sexual harassment
and favoritism claims under a variety of federal laws. Plaintiffs can use 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (1993) as the vehicle for such claims. See Bohen v. City of E. Chicago, 799
F.2d 1180, 1185 (7th Cir. 1986); Manemann, supra note 14, at 612 n.4 (noting that
§ 1983 claims are available against "officials act[ing] under the color of state law").
For claims brought under the Equal Pay Act of 1963, see DeCintio v.
however, are the most common vehicles for bringing sexual favoritism
or sexual harassment claims.23 Although state "[w]orkers' compensa-
tion statutes do not.., preempt remedies available under Title VII," in
approximately one-half of the states, such statutes do preempt all state
tort claims for victims of sexual harassment." Title VII, therefore, pro-
vides the central law under which this Comment examines sexual favor-
itism.
A. Title VII
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196425 makes it illegal "to discrimi-
nate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."26 Congress added "sex" to
the list very late in the legislative process,27 thereby depriving courts
Westchester County Medical Center, 807 F.2d 304, 308 (2d Cir. 1986) (rejecting the
Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1982), claim of a victim of sexual favoritism).
See also Manemann, supra note 14, at 632 n.134 (discussing the availability of claims
under the Equal Pay Act).
For claims brought under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment see Bohen, 799 F.2d at 1185: see also Manemann, supra note 14, at 612 n.4
(noting that some plaintiffs have brought actions under this clause).
For claims brought under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29
U.S.C. §§ 621-624 (1994), see Ayers v. AT&T, 826 F. Supp. 443, 444, 447 (S.D. Fla.
1993). In Ayers, an employee claimed that her supervisor transferred her to a less
desirable store to make room to hire his younger girlfriend. See id. at 44445.
For claims brought under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796
(1994), as related to employment decisions based upon "subjective physical attractive-
ness," see Manemann, supra note 14, at 612 n.4 (noting that courts "have not been
sympathetic" to this type of claim).
For claims brought under various torts such as negligent or intentional infliction
of emotional distress, invasion of privacy, wrongful discharge, interference with con-
tract, assault, and battery, see Ellen Frankel Paul, Sexual Harassment as Sex Dis-
crimination: A Defective Paradigm, 8 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 333, 359-63 (1990) (dis-
cussing the availability of tort remedies); E. Gary Spitko, He Said, He Said: Same-
Sex Sexual Harassment Under Title VII and the "Reasonable Heterosexist" Standard,
18 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 56, 58 & nn.7-8 (1997) (discussing tort remedies);
Manemann, supra note 14, at 612 n.4 (noting the use of tort remedies in this area).
23. See Van Tol, supra note 5, at 161 n.30 (stating that Title VII "remains primary
basis" of remedies).
24. See Spitko, supra note 22, at 59 & nn.10-13.
25. Pub. L. No. 88-352, tit. VII, § 701, 78 Stat. 253 (1964) (codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 to 17 (1994)).
26. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
27. "After a relatively brief debate, the House of Representatives" added sex to
Title VII only two days before the full House voted on and passed the 1964 Civil
Rights Act. See Phillips, supra note 5, at 563 & n.80 (citing 110 CONG. REC. 2577-84,
2804 (1964)). The Senate voted for the Act four months later without any apparent
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of a well-developed legislative history that could aid their interpretation
of what illegal sex discrimination is intended to encompassY In 1977,
the Supreme Court stated that the primary purpose of Title VII is to
eliminate discrimination in the workplace so that similarly situated
employees do not receive disparate treatment simply because they are
different sexes.' This nondescript holding was not the Court's last
word on the meaning and scope of sex discrimination under Title VII. °
Given the blank legislative slate regarding the scope of "sex" in Title VII
and a broad mandate to prevent discriminatory treatment by employers,
the courts, and the EEOC have come to recognize sexual harassment
and sexual favoritism claims as forms of sex discrimination.
1. Identifying Discriminatory Actions Under Title VII
The first problem plaintiffs had in getting their sexual harassment or
favoritism claims recognized was in proving they were victims of a form
discussion or debate regarding the inclusion of sex to the list of Title VII categories.
See id. (citing 110 CONG. REC. 14,511 (1964)); N. Morrison Torrey, Indirect Discrimi-
nation Under Title VII: Expanding Male Standing to Sue for Injuries Received as a
Result of Employer Discrimination Against Females, 64 WASH. L. REV. 365, 385
(1989) (noting that "[elven a microscopic examination of the legislative history of
Title VII sheds no light on congressional intent as to who has standing to assert sex
discrimination").
28. See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986); Phillips, supra note 5,
at 547, 563-64 & n.81 (addressing whether sexual activity is inclusive in the term
sex); Levy, supra note 14, at 668 (arguing sexual favoritism is not prohibited by Title
VII); Manemann, supra note 14, at 638-39 & nn.180-81 (citing congressional and U.S.
Department of Labor sources that noted sex was actually added to the bill in an
attempt to undermine Title VII's passage because it was evident that sex would in-
volve "problems" not applicable to the other categories listed).
29. See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 71 (1977) ("[Slimilarly
situated employees are not to be treated differently solely because they differ with
respect to race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.").
30. See, e.g., Meritor, 477 U.S. at 57.
31. In Meritor, the Supreme Court confirmed the validity of a sex discrimination
claim based upon sexual harassment. See id. at 73; infra notes 77-88 and accompany-
ing text (discussing Meritor). The validity of sexual favoritism claims, however, has
not yet received such support. See Phillips supra note 5, at 562; Levy, supra note 14,
at 669.
The EEOC plays an important role in Title VII cases. It is the organization re-
sponsible for enforcing Title VII's prohibitions. See Levy, supra note 14, at 669 n.ll.
Further, in order for a plaintiff to prevail against an employer in a Title VII civil
action, the plaintiff must file a timely complaint with the EEOC. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(e); Manemann, supra note 14, at 614 n.15.
of illegal sex discrimination. As a general approach, the Supreme Court
held that Title VII prohibits two forms of discrimination in the
workplace.' One form is "disparate treatment" in which employees
suffer intentional and unfavorable treatment based upon impermissible
criteria.' The other form is "disparate impact" in which facially neutral
acts disproportionately injure a class of employees for reasons other
than business necessity.' Sexual harassment and sexual favoritism
claims are often judged under the disparate treatment approach.n
In order to prevail in a Title VII disparate treatment case, a plaintiff
must establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, four elements of a
prima facie case. 6 These elements are as follows: (1) the plaintiffs
membership in a protected class; (2) the plaintiff's application for and
qualification for the employment benefit offered; (3) the employer's
rejection of the plaintiff; and (4) the other applicants with the same or
lesser qualifications subsequently were considered for or received the
benefit offered. 7 These elements have some flexibility and can be
modified to fit the facts of each case." The plaintiff can also rely upon
circumstantial evidence alone when proving discriminatory intent.39
2. Standing to Sue Under Title VII
Another issue commonly raised in Title VII cases is standing for
"third parties" who are not the direct objects of the disparate treat-
ment.41 In some sexual harassment cases and in sexual favoritism cas-
es, the plaintiffs who suffered an injury-in-fact may not have been the
direct or intended victims of an employer's sex-based discriminatory
32. See Manemann, supra note 14, at 614.
33. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), for a leading case
in disparate treatment analysis. See also Manemann, supra note 14, at 614 (discussing
the disparate treatment analysis).
34. See Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 452 (1982) and Dothard v. Rawlinson,
433 U.S. 321, 331 (1977), as leading examples of disparate impact analysis. See also
Manemann, supra note 14, at 614-15 & n.17 (discussing both types of employment
discrimination).
35. See Manemann, supra note 14, at 615-16 & nn.18-20 (noting some disparate
impact cases as well).
36. See Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-53 (1981);
McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
37. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; Manemann, supra note 14, at 617.
38. See United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 715
(1983); Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253 n.6.; McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802 n.13.
39. The standard does not require any direct evidence. See Aikens, 460 U.S. 714
n.3 (indicating no direct evidence is necessary); International Bhd. of Teamsters v.
United States, 431 U.S. 324, 358 n.44 (1977) (stating no direct evidence is necessary).
40. See Torrey, supra note 27, at 376; Manemann, supra note 14, at 623.
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conduct.4' Standing for such plaintiffs in Title VII cases evolved over
the course of a decade and a half beginning in 1971.42 In 1972, the Su-
preme Court, in Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.,' held
that whites had standing to sue in a Title VIII housing discrimination
case because the discrimination against nonwhites injured whites' rights
to interracial association and business contacts.' Circuit courts quick-
ly adopted this rationale in Title VII cases.45 The Fifth through Ninth
Circuits all held that white employees had a valid hostile work environ-
ment claim under Title VII when their employer discriminated against
African-Americans or Latinos.46 From this line of thinking, in 1986, the
Supreme Court, in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson,47 came to support
standing for plaintiffs in sexual harassment cases based upon a hostile
work environment theory.'
The Court in Meritor, however, did not explicitly grant standing for
plaintiffs who were not themselves "targets" of sexual harassment.49
The Court's lack of specificity on this standing issue is not surprising
given that the plaintiff in Meritor claimed to be the direct target of the
harassment.' Nor was it surprising, therefore, that the Court avoided a
discussion of the EEOC Guidelines that authorize indirect victims'
claims in sexual harassment cases.51 Currently, standing for injured
41. See Torrey, supra note 27, at 376.
42. See id. at 377 (noting that "a retired employee had to represent a class of
current employees" and citing Hackett v. McGuire Bros., 445 F.2d 442, 446-47 (3d Cir.
1971)).
43. 409 U.S. 205 (1972).
44. See id. at 208, 212.
45. See Torrey, supra note 27, at 378-80; Manemann, supra note 14, at 623-24 &
n.71.
46. See, e.g., Clayton v. White Hall Sch. Dist., 778 F.2d 457, 459-60 (8th Cir. 1985);
Stewart v. Hannon, 675 F.2d 846, 849-50 (7th Cir. 1982); EEOC v. Mississippi College,
626 F.2d 477, 481-83 (5th Cir. 1980); EEOC v. Bailey Co., 563 F.2d 439, 452-54 (6th
Cir. 1977); Waters v. Heublein, Inc., 547 F.2d 466, 469-70 (9th Cir. 1976).
47. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
48. See id. at 73; Torrey, supra note 27, at 378 (citing Mentor); Manemann, supra
note 14, at 623-24 (same). See infra notes 77-88 and accompanying text, for a discus-
sion of Meritor.
49. See Torrey, supra note 27, at 378 (calling the Court's support for standing by
third parties in sexual harassment suits "dicta"); Manemann, supra note 14, at 624
(noting that the Metitor Court did not expressly permit third party standing).
50. See Mentor, 477 U.S. at 60-61; Manemann, supra note 14, at 624.
51. See EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(g)
(1997); Manemann, supra note 14, at 624.
parties in sexual harassment cases, even those based upon a hostile
work environment, is not in doubt.52
B. States' Versions of Title VII
Some states have general antidiscrimination statutes, but these often
do not apply to cases of sex discrimination in the workplace. For exam-
ple, California's Unruh Civil Rights Act (Unruh Act)' generally prohib-
its all forms of arbitrary discrimination in business establishments, but
has no application to employment discrimination cases.' California's
Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA)n preempts the Unruh Act
in such cases. 6 Although there are some minor differences between
the wording of FEHA and Title VII, California law holds that FEHA is to
be interpreted in a manner wholly consistent with the federal courts'
interpretations of Title VII. Because the federal courts have leaned
toward non-recognition of sexual favoritism claims under Title VII,'
California is not likely to recognize sexual favoritism claims under
FEHA. The California situation is typical of other states.59
"Virtually all states ... have statutes that, like Title VII, ban sex dis-
crimination in employment."6" In Nicolo v. Citibank,6 1 a New York
state court looked to how the Second Circuit interpreted Title VII be-
fore interpreting New York's version of Title VII62 and held that con-
sensual sexual relations resulting in workplace favoritism are not an
actionable form of sex discrimination.' The Nicolo court noted "there
52. See Torrey, supra note 27, at 381 ("In short, the many federal circuit courts
that have considered the hostile work environment theory have all bestowed standing
on plaintiffs asserting this form of indirect discrimination.").
53. CAL. CIV. CODE § 51 (West 1982 & Supp. 1998).
54. See Rojo v. Kliger, 801 P.2d 373, 379-80 (Cal. 1990).
55. CAL. GOV'T. CODE § 12900 (West 1992).
56. See Rojo, 801 P.2d at 379-81.
57. See Bradley v. Harcourt, Brace and Co., 104 F.3d 267, 270 (9th Cir. 1996) (cit-
ing Clark v. Claremont Univ. Ctr. and Graduate Sch., 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d 151, 164 (Ct.
App. 1992)).
58. See infra notes 183-88 and accompanying text (discussing the current positions
of the courts).
59. See infra notes 60-65 and accompanying text (discussing the status of sexual
favoritism claims in states other than California).
60. David D. Kadue, Sexual Harassment at Work, A.L.I.-A.B.A. Course of Study,
Employment Discrimination and Civil Rights Actions in Federal and State Courts, at
494 (1992).
61. 554 N.Y.S.2d 795 (Sup. Ct. 1990).
62. See N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296(1)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1997-98).
63. See Nicolo, 554 N.Y.S.2d at 798 (citing DeCintio v. Westchester County Med.
Ctr., 807 F.2d 304 (2d Cir. 1986)). See infra notes 126-56 and accompanying text for
a full description of DeCintio.
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is nothing precluding a court of this state from making a more expan-
sive interpretation" of the New York statute than the federal courts had
of Title VII, but the Nicolo court decided to follow a restrictive reading
of the state statute.' Other states continue this pattern.6" This means
sexual favoritism claims commonly fail under state laws that are similar
or parallel to Title VII.
III. SEXUAL HARASSMENT IS UNLAWFUL DISCRIMINATION
One reason it has been so difficult for plaintiffs to get courts to rec-
ognize sexual favoritism claims is that the roots underlying the viability
of sexual harassment claims themselves are neither old nor deep. De-
spite Title VII's prohibitions against sex discrimination since 1964,' it
was not until 1986 that the United States Supreme Court recognized
sexual harassment as an unlawful form of sex discrimination.67 It is,
therefore, almost expected that courts would be slow to take hold of a
new branch of the sex discrimination tree.
A. The Courts and the EEOC Establish Anti-Sexual Harassment Rules
In the late 1970s, courts began to recognize that sexual harassment
created an "unacceptable barrier to the full and equal participation of
women in the workforce." ' Initially, there was a split in authority
64. Nicolo, 554 N.Y.S.2d at 798-99.
65. See, e.g., Polk v. Pollard, 539 So. 2d 675, 677-78 (La. Ct. App. 1989) (holding
that Louisiana's statute which "is similar in scope" to Title VII does not recognize
sexual favoritism claims); Hickman v. W-S Equip. Co., 438 N.W.2d 872, 874 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1989) (holding that sexual favoritism is not sex discrimination under Michigan's
statute resembling Title VII); Erickson v. Marsh & McLennan Co., 569 A.2d 793, 802-
03 (N.J. 1990) (discussing DeCintio and holding that a male employee's claims of a
supervisor's sexual favoritism towards a female employee who fired him and promot-
ed his paramour were nonactionable under New Jersey law); Kryeski v. Schott Glass
Techs., Inc., 626 A.2d 595, 598 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993) (holding similarly under Pennsyl-
vania's state statute).
66. See Pub. L. No. 88-352, tit. VII, § 701, 78 Stat. 253 (1964) (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 to 17 (1994)).
67. See infra notes 77-88 and accompanying text for a discussion of the landmark
case Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
68. Spitko, supra note 22, at 57 (citing CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, THE SEXUAL
HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN 27 (1979)); see also Phillips, supra note 5,, at 551
(citing 1 ARTHUR LARSON & LEX K. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 41A.21, at
8-155 to 8-158 (1993)) (discussing the historical development of sexual harassment
claims); Michael D. Vhay, Comment, The Harms of Asking: Towards a Comprehen-
among the federal courts over whether Title VII allowed sexual harass-
ment claims. 9 By 1980, however, the majority of the courts were lean-
ing toward the acceptance of sexual harassment claims.7 ° During that
same year, the EEOC issued sexual harassment guidelines declaring
that "unwelcome" sexual advances were potential Title VII violations.7
The EEOC guidelines went on to distinguish the two primary types of
sexual harassment: quid pro quo cases and hostile work environment
cases.
72
Quid pro quo sexual harassment occurs when either (1) an employ-
ee's submission to unwelcome sexual advances, requests, or conduct is
made an explicit or implicit term or condition of employment, or (2)
the employer uses the "submission to or rejection of such conduct...
as the basis for employment decisions" that impact the employee.7" A
hostile work "environment occurs when the sexually-oriented conduct
has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individu-
al's work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive
working environment."' Although these EEOC guidelines for Title VII
liability are not binding upon the courts,75 they were given the Su-
preme Court's blessing in 1986.76
B. The Supreme Court Confirms that Sexual Harassment is a Form of
Sex Discrimination
In 1986, the Court, in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson,77 gave its
imprimatur to what most of the lower courts and the EEOC had already
done over the prior decade." The plaintiff claimed she had been sexu-
sive Treatment of Sexual Harassment, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 328, 329-37 (1988) (tracing
the evolution of sexual harassment claims).
69. See Phillips, supra note 5, at 551-53 (citing various district court cases with
conflicting holdings); Van Tol, supra note 5, at 154 n.3 (same).
70. See Phillips, supra note 5, at 553 (citing LARSON & LARSON, supra note 68,
§ 41A.22, at 8-158 to 8-159).
71. See id. (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (1993)). These guidelines have remained un-
changed. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (1997).
72. See Phillips, supra note 5, at 554 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1993)); Levy,
supra note 14, at 670 (same).
73. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1997).
74. Id. § 1604.11(a)(3).
75. See Phillips, supra note 5, at 553.
76. See infra notes 77-88 and accompanying text.
77. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
78. See Paul, supra note 22, at 343; see also Christine Godsil Cooper, Sexual Ha-
rassment: Preventative Steps for the Health Care Practitioner, 2 ANNALS HEALTH L. 1,
12 (1993) (noting that by 1977 courts recognized sexual harassment as a form of sex
discrimination).
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ally involved with her supervisor for a period of several years.'9 The
plaintiff claimed this involvement was a form of sexual harassment
because even though some of the sexual conduct was voluntary, other
times it was rape.8 Because the lower courts in the case determined
there was insufficient evidence for a quid pro quo theory of sexual
harassment, the Court took up the remaining issue of whether a sexual
harassment claim was a valid cause of action under a hostile environ-
ment theory.8 '
The Court held that sexual harassment is a form of unlawful sex
discrimination under Title VII, even though the legislative history and
the statute itself are silent on the issue." The Court further held that
sexual harassment under a hostile work environment theory "must be
sufficiently severe or pervasive" before it is actionableY The standard
for severity or pervasiveness, however, is not unreasonably high; the
plaintiff must show that the actions complained of altered the plaintiffs
employment conditions and made the work environment abusive.8 4 A
plaintiff can accomplish this showing by demonstrating that the supervi-
sor's repeated sexual advances were "unwelcome."'
On the issue of employer liability in hostile environment theory cases,
however, the Court chose not to resolve the "tension" between the
EEOC's ancus curiae brief and its guidelines.' The Court "decline[d]
the parties' invitation" to decide the standard under which employers
would be held liable for their supervisor's sexual harassment of an
employee. 7
In total, Meritor is significant for proponents of sexual favoritism
claims in two different ways. On one hand, it shows that the Court is
willing to expand Title VII's definition of sex discrimination. On the oth-
79. See Mertor, 477 U.S. at 60-61.
80. See id.
81. See id. at 61-63, 66-69.
82. See id. at 63-67. In making this holding the Court also sought support from the
EEOC guidelines. See id. at 65 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a), (a)(3) (1985)).
83. See id. at 67.
84. See id.
85. See id. at 68.
86. See id. at 70-71 (citing Brief for United States and EEOC as Amici Curiae at
26 and 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(c)).
87. See id. at 72. The Court suggested, however, that the lower courts consider
the issue in light of agency theories. See id. Nevertheless, this issue may be resolved
fully once the Court makes its ruling in Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, '111 F.3d
1530 (11th Cir. 1997), cert. granted, 118 S. Ct. 438 (Nov. 14, 1997) (No. 97-282).
er, the ruling shows that the Court will sometimes, but not in all cases,
rely upon EEOC guidelines and policy statements to help it interpret
Title VII.8'
C. Sexual Favoritism's Similarities to Sexual Harassment and
Traditional Sex Discrimination
Some scholars claim that when courts accepted the argument that
sexual harassment is a form of sex discrimination, the courts were
judicially constructing a new tort because neither the legislative history
nor the express text of Title VII supports such claims." Even if sexual
harassment is a judicially created tort, this does not preclude the courts
from judicially recognizing sexual favoritism claims."
Given that sexual favoritism is based first upon a supervisor's attrac-
tion to a particular gender, a causal connection exists between the
supervisor's subsequent actions, gender, and who gets harmed.91 The
individuals that fall within the supervisor's gender preference are con-
ceivably subjected to an implicit demand that they need to be engaged
romantically with the supervisor in order to receive benefits.2 This
situation is sometimes called the implied quid pro quo form of sexual
harassment. 3 The individuals of the gender denied the supervisor's
attention and assistance suffer from what is similar to traditional sex
discrimination; they are denied opportunities because of their gender.'
88. The Court made a particular point of emphasizing the useful but non-binding
nature of the EEOC guidelines. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65 (quoting General Elec. Co.
v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141-42 (1976) for the ruling that the guidelines are "not con-
trolling upon the courts").
89. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LAWS 357 (1992); Theodore F. Claypoole, Comment, Inadequacies in
Civil Rights Law: The Need for Sexual Harassment Legislation, 48 OHIO ST. L.J.
1151, 1160 (1987).
90. The EEOC recognizes that sexual favoritism may be actionable. See 29 C.F.R.
§ 1604.11(g) (1997) ("Where employment opportunities or benefits are granted because
of an individual's submission to the employer's sexual advances or requests for sexu-
al favors, the employer may be held liable for unlawful sex discrimination against
other persons who were qualified for but denied that employment opportunity or
benefit.").
91. See Phillips, supra note 5, at 585-89 & n.175 (discussing this possible interrela-
tionship between sexual favoritism and implied quid pro quo sexual harassment
claims); Van Tol, supra note 5, at n.142. The EEOC's guidelines indicate that a valid
sexual harassment claim need not rely upon explicit quid pro quo demands but that
such demands could be made "implicitly." See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a).
92. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (noting that submission to an employer's sexual
overtures could be made "implicitly a term or condition of an individual's employ-
ment.").
93. See supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text.
94. See Phillips, supra note 5, at 565 (assuming that if sexual favoritism is gender-
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These two different types of claims, in turn, could underlie a sexual
harassment claim based upon the hostile work environment theory."
These are just a few of the theories and rationales that tend to support
the actionability of sexual favoritism. 6
IV. STATUS OF SEXUAL FAVORITISM CLAIMS BEFORE AND AFTER MERITOR
A. Sexual Favoritism Seemingly Recognized by the EEOC in 1980
Six years before Meritor, in 1980, the EEOC guidelines seemingly
added sexual favoritism to the list of illegal forms of sex discrimina-
tion. The guidelines stated that when an employer grants opportuni-
ties or benefits to employees that submit "to the employer's sexual
advances or requests for sexual favors," the other qualified persons
denied the opportunity or benefit have a viable legal claim against the
employer for sex discrimination. 9 This remedial allowance raised one
key interpretational problem regarding the ultimate viability of sexual
favoritism claims; the issue was whether consensual romantic involve-
ments were the same as ones "submitted to" by employees.9
The EEOC and most courts eventually found inherent conflicts in
their desire to protect third-party rights and simultaneously avoid re-
sponsibility for investigating the effects of consensual affairs among co-
workers. Initially, the EEOC and courts accepted favoritism claims, but
by 1990 the tide changed.99
B. Federal Courts and Sexual Favoritism Claims
Between 1983 and 1988 only six federal court cases addressed sexual
favoritism claims under the 1980 EEOC guidelines. Four courts (one
based discrimination, it may fit within the definition of a traditional form of sex
discrimination).
95. See id. at 589.
96. See infra notes 235-90 and accompanying text (discussing the reasons why
sexual favoritism is sex discrimination).
97. See 45 Fed. Reg. 74,676, 74,677 (1980) (codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(g)
(1997)).
98. See id.
99. In DeCintio v. Westchester Medical Center, 807 F.2d 304, 307-08 (2d Cir. 1986),
the court held that the EEOC's use of "submission" implied non-consensual affairs,
thus obviating sexual favoritism claims. See id.
100. See infra Part IV.B-C (discussing the evolution of sexual favoritism claims in
federal courts and with the EEOC).
circuit court and three district courts) recognized sexual favoritism as a
violation of Title VII. 1' Two other courts (one circuit court and one
district court) denied the validity of a sexual favoritism claim.' °2 Three
of these cases are discussed below.
1. Toscano v. Nimmo °3
Toscano was the first federal case to issue an opinion on the subject
of sexual favoritism."'° Margaret Toscano claimed the reason she did
not receive a promotion in spite of being better qualified than Donna
Nelson, the ultimate recipient of the promotion, was that Nelson en-
gaged in a sexual affair with their mutual supervisor.' 5 The court
found that the supervisor evidenced a pattern of unprofessional and
lascivious conduct toward women under his supervision and that he in-
tended to make the promotion based upon sexual performance."° Be-
cause men did not receive comparable treatment, the court held the
supervisor's conduct discriminatory and in violation of Title VI' °7
Although the Toscano -case resembles a case of sexual favoritism
because the promotee supposedly engaged in a consensual relationship
with her supervisor and a third party won a claim based upon the re-
sulting discriminatory treatment, Toscano could also be classified as a
rmn-of-the-mill sexual harassment case whereby the plaintiff and her co-
workers faced a hostile work environment." s Another commentator
101. See King v. Palmer, 778 F.2d 878, 880 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Broderick v. Ruder, 685
F. Supp. 1269, 1277-78 (D.D.C. 1988); Priest v. Rotary, 634 F. Supp. 571, 581-82 (N.D.
Cal. 1986); Toscano v. Nimmo, 570 F. Supp. 1197, 1199 (D. Del. 1983). For a brief
discussion of each of these cases see Van Tol, supra note 5, at 167-77, and Levy,
supra note 14, at 674-81. It is worth noting that although the Broderick court seemed
to accept the viability of a sexual favoritism cause of action, the court did not actu-
ally reach the question because it found for the plaintiff on sexual harassment
grounds. See Levy, supra note 14, at 669 (citing Broderick, 685 F. Supp. at 1277).
102. See DeCintio, 807 F.2d at 306-08; Miller v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 679 F. Supp.
495, 501 (W.D. Pa.), affd, 856 F.2d 184 (3d Cir. 1988). For a brief discussion of each
of these cases, see Van Tol, supra note 5, at 171-75.
103. 570 F. Supp. 1197 (D. Del. 1983).
104. See Phillips, supra note 5, at 556 n.48 (citing Van Tol, supra note 5, at 154).
105. See Toscano, 570 F. Supp. at 1200-03.
106. See id. at 1200.
107. See id. at 1199.
108. See DeCintio v. Westchester County Med. Ctr., 807 F.2d 304, 307 (2d Cir. 1986)
(noting that the claim in Toscano "was premised on the coercive nature of the em-
ployer's acts," not upon a supposed consensual relationship); see also Van Tol, supra
note 5, at 169 n.77 (citing Toscano for the supervisor's persistent solicitations of
women, his "phoning employees at home to brag about his sexual encounters with
other employees," and his touching and speaking to female employees in a suggestive
manner).
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claimed Toscano was really a case of implied quid pro quo sexual ha-
rassment "in which sexual favoritism played a significant role."" Re-
gardless of which interpretation is correct, it would take a different
case to better present the viability of a sexual favoritism cause of ac-
tion.
2. King v. Palmer"0
The next reported case of sexual favoritism was one where a consen-
sual relationship did lead to favoritism."' In King, Mabel King claimed
that Jean Grant, twenty years King's junior with less experience as a
nurse, received a promotion to a supervisory position instead of King
because Grant was having a sexual affair with their mutual supervi-
sor."' The district court relied upon the 1980 EEOC guidelines when
recognizing the validity of third party claims against employers in sexu-
al favoritism cases."' With those guidelines in mind, the district court
found that some level of discrimination existed because "sex [was] for
no legitimate reason a substantial factor" in Grant's promotion."'
Yet, the district court did not rule in favor of King."' The court con-
cluded that King failed to prove that Grant and their supervisor had a
sexual relationship, an obvious causal element in a sexual favoritism
claim."' The district court held that a sexual favoritism case "must
not rest on rumor, knowing winks and prurient overtones or on infer-
ences allowed in divorce law.""
7
109. See Phillips, supra note 5, at 556 n.48.
110. 598 F. Supp. 65 (D.D.C. 1984), rev'd, 778 F.2d 878 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
111. See Manemann, supra note 14, at 626-32, for a thorough discussion of the
district and circuit court cases of King.
112. See King, 598 F. Supp. at 66-67 (noting also that the supervisor made the pro-
motional decision).
113. See id. at 67 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(g)).
114. See id. at 66-67 (citations omitted). The court also went so far as to reject
explicitly as "unsupported" and incredible the employer's claim that Grant received a
promotion because she was the superior candidate. See id. at 68.
115. See id.
116. See id. at 67-69.
117. See id. at 69. The evidence of the affair was based upon the speculation of
co-workers, Grant and her supervisor's joint attendance at out-of-town conventions,
their long lunches together, a physical friendliness at the office, Grant's favorable
treatment regarding scheduling, and the testimony of one of Grant's former boyfriends
who claimed that Grant "was prepared to have sex with [her supervisor] if necessary
to get the promotion." See id. at 67-69. The evidence against the affair was based
On appeal, the parties in King stipulated that a sexual favoritism
claim was a viable cause of action under Title VII." The District of
Columbia Circuit Court accepted the lower court's ruling that the facts
of the case demonstrated a prima facie case of sex discrimination."'
The circuit court, however, overruled the district court's seeming re-
quirement that plaintiffs must prove the occurrence of sexual inter-
course.2 ' The court held that circumstantial evidence such as "kisses,
embraces and other amorous behavior" is sufficient to meet the plain-
tiffs burden of proof of a sexual affair.'2' The circuit court found am-
ple evidence that, at some level, a sexual relationship did exist between
Grant and her supervisor, that the lower court correctly found claims of
Grant's superior qualifications unconvincing, and that the sexual rela-
tionship between the two was the motivating factor in Grant's prefer-
ential treatment.'22 The court remanded the case for determination of
an appropriate remedy for King.'23
The parties in King may have recognized that sexual favoritism is
largely indistinguishable from giving promotions based upon unjustified
racial preferences. For example, compare two hypothetical statements
by an employer. In the first case, an employer informs his employees he
is not going to promote an aging African-American woman because he
always prefers whites over African-Americans. In the second case, an
employer informs his employees he is not going to promote an aging
upon the supervisor's claim of being a "settled" family man with wife and kids and
that Grant was sexually active with other men. See id. at 68. The district court's
rejection of circumstantial evidence to prove either a fully consummated sexual affair
or discrimination, however, is inconsistent with the Supreme Court's holding in Unit-
ed States Postal Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 771, 714 n.3 (1983),
which allows use of circumstantial evidence to prove discrimination in disparate treat-
ment cases.
118. See King, 778 F.2d 878, 880 (D.C. Cir. 1985). Because the D.C. Circuit Court
never had to decide the issue, it is unclear whether the court would have accepted a
sexual favoritism claim if the issue was raised properly. See id. at 883.
119. See id. at 880-81. In this regard, the circuit court implicitly accepted the con-
clusion that "gender is a substantial factor in sexual favoritism." See Phillips, supra
note 5, at 559 & n.65. For a discussion of the elements of a prima facie case in
disparate treatment cases for Title VII actions, see supra notes 36-39 and accompa-
nying text.
120. See King, 778 F.2d at 882.
121. See id.
122. See id. at 881-82.
123. See id. at 882-83. On remand, the court awarded King the promotion with back
pay and prejudgment interest. See King v. Palmer, 641 F. Supp. 186, 188 (D.D.C.
1986). This level of relief is common when plaintiffs can prove that they were not
only discriminated against, but were the better applicant for the promotion. See
Manemann, supra note 14, at 630 n.125. The district court on remand, however, did
not grant King an injunction against improper sexual conduct by her employer. See
id. at 630-32.
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African-American woman because his sexual preferences do not include
such a person. The applicant passed over for the promotion gets the
same message-job skills do not count; only the arbitrary age, race, or
sex-based personal prejudices and preferences of the employer matter.
This nondistinction in cases is a clear example of why sexual favoritism
cases are in fact examples of unlawful disparate treatment.
King represents a high-water mark for sexual favoritism claims. Per-
haps it is because of the seeming ease with which a plaintiff could
prevail in sexual favoritism cases that many courts and the EEOC came
to retreat from it. 24 Assuming that Grant and her supervisor's sexual
relationship consisted merely of conspicuous flirting based upon a gen-
uine mutual attraction, some might argue King exposes employers and
supervisors to unwarranted liability should they show any sexual attrac-
tion towards an employee who appears to gain job benefits as a result.
Such overexposure might, in turn, lead to a tidal wave of lawsuits that
would threaten to engulf the courts. This concern, however, is not
based upon the facts and holding of King.
The court of appeals found that Grant's promotion was not based
upon superior work-related qualifications but upon blatant sexual favor-
itism."'25 There is little doubt that the employees who did not receive
the same preferential treatment that Grant did were well aware of what
factors precluded their equal treatment: either they lacked some of the
attributes that garnered the supervisor's sexual interest (gender, race,
or age), or they simply were unwilling to cultivate a sexual relationship
with their supervisor in order to get a better job.
3. DeCintio v. Westchester County Medical Center
2 6
One year later, in 1986, however, the Second Circuit, in DeCintio,
rejected the law on sexual favoritism as stipulated to by the parties in
King."'27 In DeCintio, the plaintiffs were seven male respiratory thera-
pists."'28 Each therapist' claimed he was discriminated against when the
supervisor added an irrelevant requirement to the promotional job de-
124. See infra notes 157-72, 183-88 and accompanying text (discussing the EEOC's
policy change on sexual favoritism in 1990 and courts' current position on the issue).
125. See King, 778 F.2d at 881-82.
126. 807 F.2d 304 (2d Cir. 1986).
127. See id. at 307.
128. See id. at 305.
scription listing for Assistant Chief Respiratory Therapist.'29 None of
the seven men met the added requirement, but the woman with whom
the supervisor was having an consensual romantic affair, Jean Guagenti,
did.'3
0
The district court found that Guagenti and the supervisor were en-
gaged in a sexual affair and that the added promotional requirement
was irrelevant to the job and was used merely as a "pretext" to pro-
mote a lover.' The lower court held that these actions constituted
sex discrimination under Title VII. 1
32
On appeal, the circuit court accepted the factual findings of the dis-
trict court but reversed the lower court's holding. "' The Second Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals explicitly rejected the logic behind the stipulation
in King and chose to answer for itself the question of whether Title
VII's prohibition against "discrimination based upon sex" also prohibits
sexual favoritism."u The court answered in the negative. 135 In par-
ticular, the court noted that the word sex in Title VII appeared "within
a list of categories.' 6 "[R]ead in this context," the court concluded,
sex could only "logically" denote "membership in a class delineated by
gender, rather than sexual activity regardless of gender.' 37 Further,
the court found that even Meritor's recognition of sexual harassment as
sex discrimination under the hostile environment theory was based




131. See id. at 306. The requirement added to the job listing was that the new
Chief Respiratory Therapist be registered with the National Board of Respiratory
Therapists (NBRT). See id. at 305. In order to register with the NBRT, the individual
needed to have experience as a respiratory care practitioner and pass an exam on
that general subject. See id. at 305 n.i. Registration with this group did not demon-
strate special skills or knowledge in the field of neonatal care, the specific area of
service in which the plaintiffs and Guagenti worked. See id. at 305 & n.1.
132. See id. at 306.
133. See id. at 308.
134. See id. at 306-07.
135. See id. at 307.
136. See id. at 306. The other classifications are "race, color, religion or nationality."
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-(2) (a)(1) (1995); DeCintio, 807 F.2d at 306.
137. DeCintio, 807 F.2d at 306.
138. See id. at 307. Even if the legislative history of Title VII does imply that sex
should be defined as gender, however, such an implication "does not logically entail
the rejection of sexuality as an additional forbidden criterion." See Phillips; supra
note 5, at 564. In this regard, the parties in King were not in error when they inter-
preted Title VII's prohibition against sex discrimination to include discriminatory con-
duct based upon sexual affairs. Of course, the DeCintio court was not obligated to
adopt the validity of sexual favoritism claims.
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The DeCintio court's rationale for limiting the definition of sex to
gender, however, did not logically preclude adjudication of the male
plaintiffs' complaints about their supervisor's favoritism towards a fe-
male co-worker, Guagenti. Perhaps recognizing the logical gap in its
analysis, the court turned to the EEOC guidelines for help." The
court held that the guidelines' inclusion of the word "submission" when
discussing sexual relationships between employer and employee implic-
itly required coercive or harassing behavior on the part of the employer
before Title VII liability arises. 4' The court implicitly held that if the
relationship was consensual, there was no coercion and no liability."'
To further bolster its holding that consensual relationships were not
subject to Title VII liability, the court noted the EEOC's guideline that
"sexual relationships between coworkers should not be subject to Title
VII scrutiny, so long as they are personal, social relationships."'42 The
court, however, conveniently ignored other EEOC guidelines stating
that the question of whether a purely personal and social relationship
exists "without a discriminatory effect" is to be a factual determination
based upon the totality of the circumstances. 4 3 By sidestepping this
guideline, the court prevented liability from attaching to the supervi-
sor's "unfair" and discriminatory behavior.'
The court, therefore, concluded that sexual favoritism was not a
viable cause of action under Title VII because the plaintiffs were not
discriminated against because of their gender; "rather, they were dis-
criminated against because [the supervisor] preferred his par-
amour."4 ' In other words, because of Guagenti's "special relationship"
to her supervisor, the male plaintiffs were discriminated against in the
139. See DeCintio, 807 F.2d at 307-08 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(g) (1986), the
court noted with emphasis added "that '[wihere employment opportunities or benefits
are granted because of an individual's submission to the employer's sexual advances
or requests for sexual favors, the employer may be held liable for unlawful sex dis-
crimination against other persons who were qualified for but denied that employment
opportunity or benefit'").
140. See DeCintio, 809 F.2d at 307-08 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(g)).
141. See id. at 308.
142. See id. (citing Preamble to Interim Guidelines on Sex Discrimination, 45 Fed.
Reg. 25,024 (1980)).
143. See Van Tol, supra note 5, at 172-73 & n.113 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(b)
(1986)); Manemann, supra note 14, at 634 & n.148 (citing Preamble to Interim
Guidelines on Sex Discrimination, 45 Fed. Reg. 25,024 (1980)).
144. See DeCintio, 807 F.2d at 308.
145. See id. (emphasis added).
same way any female applicant (other than Guagenti) would be.'4'
One commentator noted that taking the court's special relationship
rationale to its logical conclusion results in an absurdity.147 For exam-
ple, if a supervisor demands sex from only one woman as a condition
of her employment and does not make that same demand upon other
women or men, the targeted woman was not victimized because of her
gender; she was only affected by her special relationship to the supervi-
sor.
148
A second weakness of the special relationship theory advanced by
the DeCintio court is the flawed assumption that gender was not the
basis of the favoritism.'4' If DeCintio's rationale is accurate, then the
court must have also concluded that the supervisor was bi-sexual in his
sexual preferences."' The necessity of this secondary conclusion is
easily understood when the situation is analogized to a racial setting.
For example, suppose a supervisor does not favor all white employees
equally but does favor all whites over African-Americans. When that
supervisor promotes a favored but incompetent white employee, it
should hardly matter that other white employees are passed over along
with all qualified African-Americans. Racial bias against African-Ameri-
cans is the threshold motivating factor, not the special relationship
between the supervisor and the favored white employee. By using the
same example but replacing "white" with "female" and "African-Ameri-
can" with "male," it is clear that Guagenti's special relationship with her
supervisor was based foremost upon the completely arbitrary gender
biases of the supervisor."' Recognizing this reality, some commenta-
tors refer to sexual favoritism as "actionable 'sex-plus' discrimination:
discrimination on [the] basis of gender plus some other factor such as
sex appeal or willingness to engage in [a] sexual relationship."" 2
Perhaps the best explanation of DeCintio's holding is a fear of an
endless stream of lawsuits arising from sexual favoritism claims."'
146. See id.
147. See Spitko, supra note 22, at 61-62.
148. See id.
149. See DeCintio, 807 F.2d at 308.
150. See Phillips, supra, note 5, at 565 (noting that the supervisor is presumed to
have greater sexual attraction towards females than males).
151. See id. (noting that "sexual favoritism might qualify as gender-based discrimina-
tion").
152. Id. at 565 n.92 (citing PLAYER, supra note 14, § 5.25(d)(2), at 251 & n.68).
153. One commentator referred to the "flood-gate of cases involving sexual ha-
rassment" since the late 1980s but did not address the probability of sexual favorit-
ism claims creating such a deluge upon the legal system. See Judge Debra H.
Goldstein, A Basic Understanding of Sexual Harassment, 57 ALA. LAw. 105, 105
(1996). A different comnentator speculated that sexual favoritism cases are "less
common" than traditional sex discrimination claims. See Phillips, supra note 5, at 574.
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The court itself asserted that if sexual favoritism was actionable under
Title VII, then the EEOC and the federal courts would be put in the
business of "policing [ ] intimate relationships. Such a course... is
both impracticable and unwarranted. " "l
What the court failed to recognize, however, is that it would not be
policing the bedroom; it would be policing an employer's irrelevant and
harmful gender-based prejudices that favor less qualified applicants and
discriminate against better qualified applicants. Such discriminatory
treatment is sufficient reason to warrant relief.'55 Finally, the court's
claim of impracticability is hollow; as the district court in DeCintio and
the courts in King illustrated, there are no practical difficulties encoun-
tered by the courts in recognizing the four elements of a prima facie
case of sex discrimination based upon sexual favoritism."u However,
King's legacy was put further in doubt by a change in the EEOC guide-
lines regarding sexual favoritism.
C. EEOC Changes Its Policy on Sexual Favoritism in 1990
In early 1990, EEOC chair and future United States Supreme Court
Associate Justice, Clarence Thomas, approved a new EEOC policy that
all but killed any life the sexual favoritism cause of action had after
DeCintio.'57 The EEOC's primary guideline on sexual favoritism an-
nounced that Title VII does not apply in cases of a supervisor's favorit-
ism towards his paramour, even though such treatment may be unfair
and discriminatory in nature.'" A clarifying portion of the guidelines
154. See DeCintio, 807 F.2d at 308.
155. Even if there was recognition of sexual favoritism claims, the plaintiffs' claim
in DeCintio still might fail because their prima facie case failed to show that
Guagenti was not better qualified. See Manemann, supra note 14, at 657; see also
infra notes 295, 301-03 and accompanying text (discussing an analogous situation in
Candelore v. Clark County Sanitation District, 975 F.2d 588 (9th Cir. 1992)). The
DeCintio plaintiffs were only able to show that the requirement added to the promo-
tional specification was pretextual and for Guagenti's benefit. See DeCintio, 804 F.2d
at 308. The defendants in DeCintio could prevail if they demonstrated that Guagenti
was still a better candidate in spite of the rigged promotional announcement or sexu-
al affair. See Manemann, supra note 14, at 658-61.
156. See King v. Palmer, 778 F.2d 878, 880-81 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Manemann, supra
note 14, at 633 & n.140 (citing DeCintio v. Westchester County Med. Ctr., No. 84 Civ.
5566, (S.D.N.Y. May 27, 1986)).
157. See Casey & Tuschman, supra note 6, at 53 (noting the irony of Justice Thom-
as's involvement in the new EEOC policy).
158. See Van Tol, supra note 5, at 176 (citing EEOC Policy Guidance on Employer
specifically stated that "'Title VII does not prohibit isolated instances of
preferential treatment based upon consensual romantic relation-
ships.""'" The EEOC reinforced this position with an illustrative ex-
ample: A Charging Party (CP) accurately claims a coworker gained a
promotion ahead of the CP because the coworker engaged in a consen-
sual romantic affair with the supervisor.'6° So long as the supervisor
did not subject CP's coworkers to widespread and unwelcome sexual
advances, the EEOC will not find a Title VII violation in the isolated
incident, "because men and women were equally disadvantaged by the
supervisor's conduct for reasons other than their genders."'' The
EEOC's new policy, therefore, effectively adopted the Second Circuit's
holding in DeCintio."62
The EEOC, however, apparently recognized that this policy was not
fully compatible with the Supreme Court's holding in Meritor, where
sexual activity or conduct can be highly correlated to gender and result
in unlawful discrimination.'" The EEOC, therefore, recognized two
limited forms of "sexual favoritism" claims.'" One form of actionable
sexual favoritism is based upon explicit or implicitly coerced sexual
conduct.' 5 The other form of actionable sexual favoritism arises when
sexual favoritism is widespread in the workplace.'"
Liability Under Title VII for Sexual Favoritism, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 32, at D-
1 (Feb. 15, 1990) available in WESTLAW, BNA-DLR File [hereinafter EEOC Policy
II).
159. See id. (quoting EEOC Policy II, supra note 158, at D-1).
160. See Van Tol, supra note 5, at 176 n.144 (citing EEOC Policy II, supra note
158, at D-1).
161. See id.
162. Cf. DeCintio v. Westchester County Med. Ctr., 807 F.2d 304, 308 (2d Cir. 1986)
(holding that the male plaintiffs "were not prejudiced because of their status as
males; . . . [they] faced exactly the same predicament as that faced by any woman").
163. For a discussion of Meritor, see supra notes 77-88 and accompanying text.
164. See Van Tol, supra note 5, at 176. The EEOC's definition of sexual favoritism
is vastly different from the one used in this Comment. See supra note 2 (discussing
this Comment's definition of sexual favoritism).
165. See id. at 176 & n.142 (citing EEOC Policy II, supra note 158, at D-1 to D-2);
Levy, supra note 14, at 682. Because explicitly coerced sexual conduct does not
comport with this Comment's definition of sexual favoritism, the EEOC's definition of
sexual favoritism in this case is really just run-of-the-mill sexual harassment. See 29
C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1997) (defining "typical" sexual harassment). Implicit coercion,
however, potentially touches upon sexual favoritism cases so long as there is a pre-
sumption that subordinates are always subject to some implicit coercion when ap-
proached by their supervisors for a sexual relationship. See Van Tol, supra note 5, at
160 n.27, 178-79.
166. See Van Tol, supra note 5, at 176 (citing EEOC Policy II, supra note 158, at
D-1 to D-2). This definition of sexual favoritism is also inconsistent with the one
used in this Comment. See supra note 2 (discussing this Comment's definition of
sexual favoritism). The situation EEOC describes is one where a hostile work envi-
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In the latter case, "widespread" has the potential of being vague, so
the EEOC cited the case of Broderick v. Ruder'67 as an example of
when the number and frequency of "consensual" relationships is
excessive." The EEOC's summary of the facts in Broderick is as fol-
lows: A staff attorney claimed that two secretaries had romantic affairs
with two of the staff attorney's supervisors and received "promotions,
cash awards, and other job benefits" while another supervisor promoted
the career of a staff attorney to whom he clearly felt an attraction.'69
While the Broderick court found the facts constituted a hostile work
environment, the EEOC "declared that: '[Tihese facts could also support
an implicit "quid pro quo" harassment claim since the managers, by
their conduct, communicated a message to all female employees in the
office that job benefits would be awarded to those who participated in
sexual conduct.'"'7
Conceivably, a practice or pattern of improper behavior in work envi-
ronments could occur when, in a small office, only one promotion per
year is possible but the supervisor's new paramour gets it for two con-
secutive years. 7' Further, the Broderick example demonstrates that
the level of voluntariness of a relationship between the supervisor and
the beneficiary does not necessarily alter the hostile work environment
created or the implicit quid pro quo message received by the employ-
ees." Given this possibility, the difference between isolated instances
and widespread cases of actionable sexual favoritism is rather small.
ronment theory is applicable, and widespread sexual favoritism is merely proof of the
problem. See Levy, supra note 14, at 683. Further, if the environment is such that it
effectively tells one gender that the way to get ahead is by sleeping with the boss,
then that gender has an implicit quid pro quo claim against the employer. See Van
Tol, supra note 5, at 176 n.142; Levy, supra note 14, at 683 n.133.
167. 685 F. Supp. 1269 (D.D.C. 1988).
168. See Casey & Tuschman, supra note 6, at 55 (citing EEOC Policy II, supra
note 158, at D-2); Levy, supra note 14, at 683 n. 133.
169. See Casey & Tuschman, supra note 6, at 55 (citing EEOC Policy II, supra
note 158, at D-2).
170. See id. (quoting EEOC Policy II, supra note 158, at D-2).
171. Such patterns of behavior, "[b]eyond the fear of sexual harassment . . . may
be perceived as harnful insofar as they taint the decision making process. Any grant
of a benefit based on considerations other than merit is likely to be viewed as
unfair." Martha Chamallas, Consent, Equity, and the Control of Sexual Conduct, 61 S.
CAL. L REV. 777, 856 (1988).
172. See id. (suggesting that sexual favoritism may transmit tacit signals of a hostile
work environment); Van Tol, supra note 5, at 178-79 (arguing that "consensual sexual
relationships" nevertheless create a hostile work environment for workers).
D. 1991 Amendments to Title VII
Prior to 1989, the Supreme Court used a "but-for" test"r when de-
termining whether an employee received discriminatory treatment be-
cause of her sex.' In 1989, the Court, in Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins,'75 discarded the but-for test and, via a plurality opinion,
adopted a "because-of' test.76 This new test was not much different
from the but-for test. The because-of test requires that a plaintiff merely
show "that gender played a motivating part in an employment deci-
sion.""r This test, however, began to resemble the but-for test when
the plurality also held that an employer could avoid liability if it could
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have taken the
same action if gender was not a factor in the employer's decision or
act. 178
In 1991, Congress amended Title VII by adding § 703(m) to the Civil
Rights Act of 1991.1- The amendment stated that "[e]xcept as other-
wise provided" in Title VII, unlawful sex discrimination is established
once the plaintiff demonstrates that sex "was a motivating factor for
any employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the
practice."8 ° This language purported to overrule the portion of
Hopkins that sheltered employers and to reinforce the rule that when-
ever discrimination is shown to be a contributing factor in an employ-
ment decision, liability can attach. 81 This new "motivating factor" test
clearly has the potential to fully legitimize a cause of action for sexual
favoritism, assuming that courts are willing to accept the fact that gen-
der plays a key role in sexual favoritism cases.182
173. The but-for test asks whether the disparate treatment an employee received
would have occurred if the plaintiffs gender was different. See Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 240 (1989) (applying the but-for standard); City of Los Angeles
Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 711 (1978) (employing the but-for
test).
174. See Phillips, supra note 5, at 566.
175. 490 U.S. 228 (1989). In Hopkins, a plaintiff claimed that she did not make
partner at an accounting firm because of a combination of sex discrimination and a
disagreeable personality. See id. at 234-36.
176. See id. at 240-42.
177. See id. at 250.
178. See id. at 252-53.
179. See Phillips, supra note 5, at 567.
180. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (1994).
181. See Phillips, sup'ra note 5, at 567-70 & nn.102-07 (citing numerous sources of
legislative history behind the 1991 amendment to Title VII).
182. See id. at 569.
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E. Courts' Current Views of Sexual Favoritism
Despite the potential favorable impact the 1991 amendment to Title
VII could have on the viability of sexual favoritism claims, DeCintio
and the 1990 EEOC policy statements still persuade more courts than
not against recognition of sexual favoritism claims. At the start of 1998,
the Second,' 3 Fourth,'" and Tenth' 5 Circuits and some states'8
explicitly rejected the validity of sexual favoritism claims. The Ninth
Circuit explicitly left the issue undecided.'7 Only the D.C. Circuit still
tacitly accepts the validity of sexual favoritism claims."s The other cir-
cuits have yet to address the issue.
183. See DeCintio v. Westchester County Med. Ctr., 807 F.2d 304, 308 (2d Cir. 1986);
supra notes 126-56 and accompanying text (discussing DeCintio).
184. See Becerra v. Dalton, 94 F.3d 145, 149-50 (4th Cir. 1996) (holding that sexual
favoritism is not actionable under Title VII and citing DeCintio), cert. denied, 117 S.
Ct. 1087 (1997).
185. See Taken v. Oklahoma Corp. Comm'n, 125 F.3d 1366, 1370 (10th Cir. 1997)
(holding that sexual favoritism although "unfair" and "unwise" does not violate Title
VII and citing DeCintio).
186. Some states' highest courts have found sexual favoritism nonactionable. See
Herman v. Western Fin. Corp., 869 P.2d 696, 701-03 (Kan. 1994) (holding that sexual
favoritism does not by itself rise to sexual discrimination or sexual harassment under
a hostile work environment theory); Erickson v. Marsh & McLennan Co., 569 A.2d
793, 801-03 (N.J. 1990) (citing DeCintio and holding that a male employee's claims of
sexual favoritism towards a female employee by a supervisor who fired him and
promoted his paramour is nonactionable under New Jersey law). The Third Circuit,
using New Jersey state law but referring to EEOC guidelines, confirmed Erickson and
held that sexual favoritism is only partial evidentiary proof that a hostile work envi-
ronment exists. See Drinkwater v. Union Carbide Corp., 904 F.2d 853, 860-63 (3d Cir.
1990) (citing Erickson, 569 A.2d at 801).
187. See Candelore v. Clark County Sanitation Dist., 975 F.2d 588, 591-92 (9th Cir.
1992) (per curiam) (Kleinfeld, J. concurring) (emphasizing that Candelore does not
decide the issue of whether sexual favoritism is actionable under Title VII and that
the issue had not been reached in the Ninth Circuit). Similar holdings exist at the
district court level within other circuits. For example, in the Seventh Circuit, the
Central District Court of Illinois claimed that "the Seventh Circuit has not addressed
the issue" of whether sexual favoritism is actionable. See Dirksen v. City of Spring-
field, 842 F. Supp. 1117, 1121 (C.D. Ill. 1994).
188. See King v. Palmer, 778 F.2d 878, 880-82 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (where the parties
and the district court did not challenge the presumption that single instances of sexu-
al favoritism are actionable as a form of sex discrimination under Title VII); see also
Broderick v. Ruder, 685 F. Supp. 1269, 1277-78 (D.D.C. 1988) (considering application
of a sexual favoritism cause of action analysis but never reaching the issue).
V. CORRELATION BETWEEN SEXUAL FAVORITISM AND SEX DISCRIMINATION
Sexual favoritism should be actionable if its causes and effects are
sufficiently similar to traditional sexual harassment or sex discrimina-
tion cases or if its causes and effects are within the scope of Title VII's
prohibitions. Courts, scholars, and the EEOC have commented on
whether either of these situations exist. This Comment summarizes
many of the arguments made.
A. Sexual Favoritism is not Sex Discrimination
There are at least nine interrelated arguments for rejecting sexual
favoritism claims. Many of these arguments are based upon strictly
limiting the definition of sex in Title VII to gender. Other arguments
rely upon public policy rationales.
1. "Sex" Plainly Means "Gender" Under Title VII
If the definition of sex under Title VII was not limited to gender but
included sexual activity, it would much easier to justify making sexual
favoritism claims actionable.'" The relevant, albeit scanty, legislative
history for Title VII, however, lacks any discussion of sexuality or sexu-
al conduct.'" "Instead, [the legislative history] stresses gender at every
turn."'' Even the outspoken opponents of the amendment that added
sex to Title VII acted on the premise that sex was limited to gender."
The Second Circuit focused on this issue in DeCintio and in doing so
also cited other courts' refusals to extend sex beyond gender-based
discrimination.93
189. See Phillips, supra note 5, at 563.
190. See id. Indeed, it. is this very absence of such language that prompted more
than one commentator to argue that even egregious sexual harassment claims are
technically improper causes of action under Title VII. See, e.g., EPSTEIN, supra note
89, at 357; Claypoole, supra note 89, at 1160.
191. Phillips, supra note 5, at 564 (citing multiple sources within the legislative
record).
192. See id. (citing 110 CONG. REC. 2577-78, 2581-82, 2584 (statements of Rep.
Celler, Rep. Green, and Rep. Roosevelt)).
193. See DeCintio, 807 F.2d 304, 306-07 (2d Cir. 1986) (citing Meritor Sav. Bank v.
Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 63-64 (1986), and quoting Sommers v. Budget Mktg., Inc., 667
F.2d 748, 750 (8th Cir. 1982), for precedent regarding sex's "'traditional definition'");
Manemann, supra note 14, at 639-41.
[Vol. 25: 819, 1998] Paramours, Promotions, and Sexual Favoritism
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
2. Congress Meant Only to Provide Equality for Women
Even if sexual favoritism cases are deemed to have some level of
gender-based causal connection to an employer's disparate treatment of
employees in the workplace, Title VII's prohibitions against sex discrim-
ination are focused only on "'providing equal opportunities for wom-
en.'"194One supporter of the sex amendment claimed that the purpose
of the amendment was to provide "'equal opportunity in employment
for women. No more-no less.""95 If equality of women in the
workplace is the sole and limited intent of the sex discrimination provi-
sion of Title VII, then sexual favoritism cases, where women are not the
only victims, exceeds the scope of the Act. At the very least, the
sponsors' preoccupation with equality for women in the workplace
tends to support the argument that gender is the proper and limited
definition of sex under Title VII.
3. There is No Sex Discrimination in Sexual Favoritism Cases
Because both men and women are considered to be equal victims in
a sexual favoritism case, sex (gender) does not have a causal connec-
tion to the discriminatory acts of the employee and is, therefore, not
actionable. This was the central argument in DeCintio" which the
EEOC 97 and other courts adopted.'98
4. Congress Refuses to Broaden Title VII's Scope
In the 1970s and 1980s, Congress was highly unsuccessful in expand-
ing Title VII prohibitions to include discrimination in "'affectional or
194. See Manemann, supra note 14, at 641 (quoting Sommers, 667 F.2d at 750); see
also Phillips, supra note 5, at 563-64 (citing various legislative sponsors of the
amendment to include the word sex in Title VII). This rationale, of course, was con-
clusively rejected in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 118 S. Ct. 998,
1002-03 (1998) when the Court held that even male-on-male sexual harassment is
illegal under Title VII.
195. See Phillips, supra note 5, at 564 (quoting 110 CONG. REC. 2583 (1964) (state-
ment of Rep. Kelly)).
196. See supra notes 126-56 and accompanying text (discussing DeCintio).
197. See supra notes 157-72 and accompanying text (discussing the EEOC's 1990
policy change).
198. See, e.g., Taken v. Oklahoma Corp. Comm'n, 125 F.3d 1366, 1370 (10th Cir.
1997); Becerra v. Dalton, 94 F.3d 145, 149-50 (4th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct.
1087 (1997); Nicolo v. Citibank, 554 N.Y.S.2d 795, 798-99 (Sup. Ct. 1990).
sexual orientation"' cases.1" Some courts took notice of these failures
when justifying their "narrow, traditional interpretation" of the defini-
tion of sex when addressing claims based upon transsexuality.2"
While Congress's failure to pass bills explicitly broadening sex discrim-
ination liability does not directly speak to the issue of sexual favoritism,
it does reinforce the argument that the definition of sex is intended to
be limited to gender." '
5. Judicial Restraint
The courts are often slow to act where Congress has not. The doc-
trine of judicial restraint is a rationale for limiting the scope of liability
under Title VII. 2 2 Although this doctrine is not absolute,2 "3 most
courts choose to engage in judicial restraint when it comes to sexual
favoritism claims.2 "4 As one court noted, even though remedial stat-
utes, such as Title VII, should be liberally interpreted, courts should not
exceed "the prerogatives of Congress."205
An additional justification for courts' reluctance to recognize sexual
favoritism claims is the 1990 EEOC guidelines that clearly disfavor such
claims.2" The guidelines "'constitute a body of experience and in-
formed judgment to which the courts and litigants may properly resort
199. See Manemann, supra note 14, at 642 & n.210 (quoting Ulane v. Eastern Air-
lines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1085 (7th Cir. 1984)); see also Phillips, supra note 5, at
564-65 & n.90.
200. See Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1084-87; Sommers v. Budget Mktg., Inc., 667 F.2d 748,
750 (8th Cir. 1982).
201. See Phillips, supra note 5, at 565.
202. See Manemann, supra note 14, at 642. Judicial restraint "compels judges to
defer to explicit or implicit legislative judgments on policy issues" because publicly
elected bodies are best able to represent the governed and determine what is best
for the public. See id. at 647.
203. See Phillips, supra note 5, at 564. The doctrine has not prevented the courts
from recognizing that improper sexual conduct or sexual favoritism is within the
scope of unlawful sex discrimination. See id. at 551-62; see also Manemann, supra
note 14, at 647-49 (discussing the viability of the "opposite pole"-"judicial activism").
Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986), clearly stands out as an example of
the courts' freedom in deciding the limits of Title VII. See supra notes 77-88 (dis-
cussing Meritor).
204. See Phillips, supra note 5, at 564. Judicial restraint was "a primary rationale
underlying the DeCintio decision." See Manemann, supra note 14, at 647. On the oth-
er hand, it was the non-application of this doctrine which first allowed sexual harass-
ment cases to be recognized as a form of sex discrimination under Title VII. See
Claypoole, supra note 89, at 1160; Manemann, supra note 14, at 649.
205. See Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1086. For a discussion of the remedial nature of Title
VII, see itfra note 258 and accompanying text.
206. See supra notes 157-72 and accompanying text (discussing the 1990 EEOC
guidelines).
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for guidance."'2 7 In total, the courts have not challenged the silence of
Congress nor rejected the narrow policy statements of the EEOC.2"
6. Title VII's 1991 Amendment does not Support Sexual Favoritism
Claims
As noted earlier, section 703(m) was added to Title VII in 1991,2'
and it authorizes sex discrimination claims in cases where sex is a "mo-
tivating factor" in an employer's discriminatory actions."' The opening
clause to section 703(m) is significant; it contained the qualifier
"[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this subchapter."' This exception
does not overrule section 703(a)'s mandate that the victim of sex dis-
crimination must suffer an injury "because of' her sex or gender."2
Even if the "because of language under section 703(a) is held to sec-
tion 703(m)'s motivating factor test, section 703(a) still requires the test
be focused upon the gender of the victim, not the benefiting par-
amour.2"3 In sexual favoritism cases, it is the paramour's gender, not
the victim's, that partially motivates the employer or supervisor.2 4
Therefore, section 703(m) does not support sexual favoritism claims,
and "[tihis conclusion is reinforced by the legislative history of section
703(m), which is almost entirely preoccupied with Hopkins and which
does not mention sexual favoritism claims."211
7. Sexual Favoritism is Not Sufficiently Coercive
Title 29 of the Code of Federal Regulations conditions sexual harass-
ment and third party liability primarily upon an individual's submission
to an employer's sex-based acts.216 "Submission to" necessarily invokes
207. Levy, supra note 14, at 669 n.11. (quoting General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429
U.S. 125, 142 (1976)).
208. See supra notes 183-88 and accompanying text (discussing the current status of
sexual favoritism claims in the courts).
209. See supra notes 179-82 and accompanying text.
210. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (1994).
211. See id.
212. See Phillips, supra note 5, at 570-71 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)).
213. See id.
214. See id. at 570.
215. See id. at 571.
216. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a), (g) (1997). The relevant text for subsection (a)
states:
Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and . . . conduct of
an element of coercion which is not present in consensual relationships
found in sexual favoritism cases.217
8. Sexual Favoritism is Analogous to Non-Actionable Nepotism
Because sexual favoritism is not truly discrimination based upon
gender, it is "'more akin to nepotism,"' and if a supervisor "'favors a
"close friend," other men and women do not"' have a valid claim.1 8
This rationale naturally relies upon the premise that sex discrimination
is based solely upon gender and that sexual favoritism does not meet
that criteria.2 9 This rationale also assumes that nepotism is not ac-
tionable.220
9. Sexual Favoritism is Not a Sufficiently Immoral Act
One major assumption about the law is that it "cannot eliminate all
forms of employment discrimination and therefore should focus on its
worst manifestations."' In deciding what is "worst," ethicists judge
the morality of sexual favoritism from several different perspectives.2"
a sexual nature constitute sexual harassment when (1) submission to such
conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of an indi-
vidual's employment, (2) submission to or rejection of such conduct by an
individual is used as the basis for employment decisions affecting such indi-
vidual ....
29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a). Subsection (g) reads, "[wihere employment opportunities or
benefits are granted because of an individual's submission to the employer's sexual
advances or requests for sexual favors, the employer may be held liable for unlawful
sex discrimination against other persons who were qualified for but denied that em-
ployment opportunity or benefit." 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(g).
217. See DeCintio v. Westchester County Med. Ctr., 807 F.2d 304, 307-08 (2d Cir.
1986); Levy, supra note 14, at 673; see also Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57,
67 (1986) (holding that sexual harassment "must be sufficiently severe or pervasive to
alter the conditions of [the victim's] employment and create an abusive working envi-
ronment") (alteration in original) (quoting Henson v. Dandee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (11th
Cir. 1982)).
218. See Casey & Tuschman, supra note 6, at 53 (quoting Ayers v. AT&T, 826 F.
Supp. 443, 445 (S.D. Fla. 1993)). In Ayers, an employee claimed that her supervisor
transferred her to a less desirable store so that the supervisor could make room to
hire his younger girlfriend. Ayers, 826 F. Supp. at 444.
219. See id.
220. For a brief discussion of nepotism and the problems that might arise when
employers hire or promote their spouses, see Manemann, supra note 14, at 612 n.4.
221. Phillips, supra note 5, at 572-73 (citing Larry Alexander, What Makes Wrongful
Discrimination Wrong? Biases, Preferences, Stereotypes, and Proxies, 141 U. PA. L
REv. 149, 203 (1992)).
222. See Phillips, supra note 5, at 573.
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One perspective is that the moral worth of an act is based upon the
act's consequences." 3 Although sexual favoritism is likely to have a
negative impact in the workplace, "it does not denigrate classes of peo-
ple" the way traditional race, religion, or gender discrimination cases
do.i
Another perspective is that the relatively low probability of the act's
occurrence tempers its significance.225 Because sexual favoritism often
threatens workplace morale and efficiency, employers "arguably have
an incentive to penalize such relationships without prodding from the
law." 6 Thus, "it might be safer to leave workplace sexual favoritism
unregulated.""
A final perspective is that an act's moral standing is based in part
upon the "innate nature of the act or the motives that underlie it."2"
In traditional race, national origin, or sex discrimination cases, the prej-
udice is directed at "immutable traits."" 9 In sexual favoritism cases,
however, the attractiveness of the subordinate in the eyes of the superi-
or can change even if her gender does not.' Further, the victims of
sexual favoritism cases are not made victims because the employer be-
lieves they are intellectually, physically, or morally inferior people as is
often the case in traditional race, sex, national origin, or religion dis-
crimination cases."l
Because sexual favoritism is arguably less immoral than other forms
of discrimination, recognizing sexual favoritism claims could be the
camel's nose under the Title VII tent. 2 The whole camel, therefore,
might include liability for a host of other upsetting acts such as discrim-
ination based upon "sexual orientation, transsexuality, and appear-
223. See id. (noting that this perspective is called a "consequentialist" theory).
224. See id. at 574.
225. See id. (noting that this perspective comes from a "meritocratic" standpoint).
226. See id. at 574-75 & n. 124.
227. Id. at 575.
228. Id. at 573 (noting that this perspective is called a "deontological" theory).
229. See id. at 575.
230. See id. at 575-76.
231. See id. at 576. Additionally, "[unilike some forms of sex discrimination ....
sexual favoritism is not the product of misogyny or of the view that (competence
aside) women simply should not perform certain social functions." See id.
232. See id.
ance."r Presumably, the public and courts are not interested in grant-
ing new protections in these cases.'n
B. Sexual Favoritism is Sex Discrimination
Although persuasive to some, none of the aforementioned arguments,
whether taken individually or together, actually provide an irrebuttable
legal rationale for rejecting sexual favoritism claims under Title VII.
No jurisdiction is prevented from recognizing sexual favoritism claims
by constitutional or federal law. Further, there are at least ten argu-
ments for making sexual favoritism actionable.
1. "Sex" Can Plainly Mean More Than "Gender"
Even if most sponsors and opponents of the sex amendment to Title
VII primarily spoke of sex discrimination as being a gender issue,"'
their commentary is suggestive but not controlling upon the courts."
Judges are free to turn to their own dictionaries for a plain meaning
definition of sex.'2 One commentator noted that sex has two plainly
acceptable meanings: one being gender and the other being sexuality or
sexual conduct.' Further, not all legislators were unaware of the
multiple interpretations sex and sex discrimination could have. Some
members of Congress argued that "'sex discrimination' was sufficiently
different from other types of discrimination that it ought to receive
separate legislative treatment."" ° This concern implies that different
or unique types of claims could arise under the umbrella of sex discrim-
ination."3 Mertor evidenced this potential when it judicially read sex-
233. See id. at 574 (citing PLAYER, supra note 14, at § 5.25(c)(2), (d) (1)-(2)).
234. See id.
235. See id. at 564.
236. See supra notes 25-31, 190-93 and accompanying text (discussing Title ViI's
legislative history).
237. See Phillips, supra note 5, at 564 (noting that "the legislative history's preoccu-
pation with gender does not logically entail the rejection of sexuality as an additional
forbidden criterion").
238. See Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc., 99 F.3d 138, 145 (4th Cir. 1996)
(Murnaghan, J., dissenting) (noting that in light of the dearth of legislative history
addressing the issue, the court should turn to the dictionary for a definition of
"sex").
239. See PLAYER, supra note 14, § 5.25(a), at 239 (citing WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE
DICTIONARY 1062 (1976) and arguing that courts merely divine a definition of sex
when they narrowly construe sex as gender).
240. See Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 63-64 (1986) (citing 110 CONG.
REc. 2577, 2584 (1964) (statements of Rep. Celler and Rep. Green)).
241. See Terry Nicole Steinberg, Rape on College Campuses: Return Through Title
XI, 18 J.C. & U.L. 39, 55 (1991) (noting that under the "umbrella" of Title VII, rape
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ual harassment claims under a hostile environment theory into Title VII
coverage.242 Sexual favoritism could be another such cause of action.
2. Sexual Favoritism Claims Help Provide Equality for Women
Although much of the legislative history indicates that the goal of
providing equality for women in workplace was one reason why sex
discrimination was added to Title VII,2" this history is not dispositive
on the issue of whether other manifestations of sex discrimination,
including favoritism, are actionable under Title VII.2 Indeed, the
Supreme Court recently held in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services,
Inc.," that cases of male-on-male sexual harassment are actionable as
a form of sex discrimination under Title VII.246
Further, even if the goal of Title VII is to provide for equality of wom-
en in the workplace, sexual favoritism claims promote such a goal. For
example, if a female supervisor promoted her male paramour instead of
any number of better qualified female employees, the statutory ideal of
equal treatment of women in the workplace is arguably not advanced
unless a sexual favoritism claim is allowed. In a presumably more com-
mon case, a male supervisor promotes his female paramour instead of
other better qualified female employees. 7 Dismissing a sexual favorit-
ism suit in such a scenario does not create equal opportunities for all
women, but undermines the principle of equality in the workplace by
implicitly adding sexual standards to job descriptions.2'
could be considered sex discrimination).
242. See id. at 73; supra notes 77-88 and accompanying text (discussing Meritor).
243. See supra notes 194-95 and accompanying text.
244. Phillips, supra note 5, at 564.
245. 118 S. Ct. 998 (1998). Justice Scalia, writing for a unanimous court, stated that
nothing in Title VII necessarily bars "a claim of discrimination 'because of ... sex'
merely because the plaintiff and the defendant (or the person charged with acting on
behalf of the defendant) are of the same sex." Id. at 1001-02.
246. Id. at 1002-03.
247. See Van Tol, supra note 5, at 166 (noting that in most sexual favoritism cases
a female worker receives preferential treatment and the victims are usually other
qualified women).
248. See id. at 161 (asserting that power is the one consistent factor throughout all
sexual discrimination claims and concluding that the use of power to obtain sexual
favors undermines the integrity of the workplace).
3. Victimizing Both Men and Women does Not Avoid Liability
The DeCintio court and the EEOC both concluded that in cases of
sexual favoritism men and women face "exactly the same predica-
ment"249 and are "equally disadvantaged""' by an employer's dis-
criminatory behavior. It is worth noting that although both sexes are
disadvantaged, the nature of the discrimination will certainty vary de-
pending on the victim's gender.
The employees of the gender not subject to a supervisor's sexual
interest are in a different position from those of the gender that does
arouse the sexual interest of supervisor.2"' The employees of the gen-
der not targeted by the amorous behavior have a relatively obvious sex
discrimination claim.2"2 On the other hand, employees of the gender
that garners a supervisor's sexual interest (except for the actual par-
amour) have the basis of an implied quid pro quo sexual harassment
claim.2" The EEOC and some courts, however, have made an arbi-
trary decision to avoid recognizing the validity of these separate claims
by lumping them together under the single designation of non-action-
able sexual favoritism.26
Even if it is true that men and women are equally disadvantaged in
sexual favoritism cases, the court in King v. Palmer" understood
that the scope and invidiousness of sex discrimination could include
such a situation. The King court clearly expressed this view in writing
that "unlawful sex discrimination occurs whenever sex is '"for no le-
gitimate reason a substantial factor in the discrimination."' 25
4. Congress's Failure to Amend Title VII is Not Dispositive
Although Congress did not pass any of the numerous bills that would
have explicitly amended Title VII to include antidiscrimination language
249. See DeCintio v. Westchester County Med. Ctr., 807 F.2d 304, 308 (2d Cir. 1986).
250. See EEOC Policy II, supra note 158, at D-1.
251. This argument presumes that the supervisor in question is not bisexual. See
supra notes 150-52 and accompanying text.
252. In a traditional sex discrimination case, the gender not chosen for favoritism
can make out a prima facie case with relative ease. Compare the elements of a pri-
ma facie case of disparate treatment analysis under Title VII at supra notes 36-39
and accompanying text with the situation above.
253. See Phillips, supra note 5, at 554.
254. See, e.g., DeCintio, 807 F.2d at 306-08; Miller v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 679 F.
Supp. 495, 501 (W.D. Pa. 1985); EEOC Policy II, supra note 158, at D-1.
255. 778 F.2d 878 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
256. Id. at 880 (quoting the D.C. District Court's holding in the case below, 598 F.
Supp. 65, 66-67 (D.D.C. 1984) (quoting Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 942-43 (D.C.
Cir. 1981)) (internal quotations omitted).
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regarding homosexuals, transsexuals, and effeminate men, this fact has
no logical bearing upon the viability of sexual favoritism cases." ' If
such evidence was compelling, then Congress's defeat of the original
sex amendment to Title VII that limited discrimination based "solely"
upon sex2 8 would be equally compelling in favor of allowing sexual
favoritism claims.
5. Title VII Should Be Broadly Construed
To fulfill Title VII's role as a remedial statute, the Supreme Court has
determined that it should be interpreted broadly, and courts "'must
avoid interpretations... that deprive victims of discrimination of a
remedy.'"2" As has already been admitted even by the DeCintio court,
sexual favoritism is an "unfair" form of discrimination.2" In light of
sexual favoritism's harmful and unfair effect on otherwise qualified
employees, the mandate to interpret Title VII broadly should supersede,
or at least countervail, the doctrine of judicial restraint.26
Reliance upon the EEOC policy guidance statements for additional
proof of the reasonableness of the doctrine of judicial restraint is mis-
placed. First, the EEOC's guidelines are not binding upon the
courts.262 Second, what appears in the Code of Federal Regulations is
merely one administration's interpretation of Title VII.2" Further, as
explained earlier, the guidelines that relate to sexual favoritism claims
have not been static.2" Nor does the executive branch always repre-
257. See Phillips, supra note 5, at 564-65.
258. See Manemann, supra note 14, at 646 (citing Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983,
991 (D.C. Cir. 1977) and Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publ'g Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1089
(5th Cir. 1975) (en banc)).
259. See id. at 645 & n.241 (quoting County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S.
161, 178 (1981) (holding that even when there is not a member of the opposite sex
in a higher paying but equal job, a plaintiff may bring an equal pay for equal work
claim under Title VII)).
260. See DeCintio v. Westchester County Med. Ctr., 807 F.2d 304, 308 (2d Cir. 1986)
(holding that despite the unfair nature of the supervisor's acts, sexual favoritism is
non-actionable).
261. See supra notes 202-07 and accompanying text for the judicial restraint argu-
ment against recognizing sexual favoritism claims.
262. See Levy, supra note 14, at 669 & n.11 (quoting General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert,
429 U.S. 125, 141-42 (1976)).
263. See id.
264. A comparison of 1980 guidelines with the 1990 guidelines reveals substantial
revision. Compare supra notes 97-100 and accompanying text with supra notes 157-
sent the sentiments of the people it governs when it writes policy
guidelines. Judge Richard Posner of the Seventh Circuit concluded that
when attitudes toward sexual propriety change, a court "'must decide,
in light of information not available to the promulgators of the [statute
or constitutional construction], what the rule should mean in its new
setting."'265 Assuming that most people do not want their employment
opportunity held hostage to the sexual preferences of an employer or
the sexual attractiveness of an inferior employee, the viability of sexual
favoritism claims under Title VII should not be in doubt.
Finally, courts need not disregard all EEOC guidelines when broadly
construing Title VII to allow sexual favoritism cases. There is only one
EEOC guideline that lobbies directly against sexual favoritism
claims.266 If that guideline was ignored in the same way the Court
sidestepped other EEOC policy statements in Meritor,267 sexual favor-
itism claims could be recognized by liberally interpreting the EEOC's
other policy statements.2"
6. Title VII's 1991 Amendments Support Sexual Favoritism Claims
Given the premise that gender is a motivating factor in sexual favorit-
ism cases, section 703(m),269 which forbids discriminatory practices
motivated by gender, seems to recognize sexual favoritism claims under
Title VII.276 The argument that section 703(a) requires that the discrim-
inatory motivation be directed at the victim instead of the paramour27 '
is too one-sided. Using this section 703(a) argument in a racial setting
leads to unacceptable results. For example, it seems inconceivable that
an employer could escape liability by claiming that his refusal to hire a
highly qualified African-American because of her race was really just a
72 and accompanying text. Nor has the EEOC been consistent with its policy state-
ments even when appearing before the Supreme Court. See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vin-
son, 477 U.S. 57, 68, 70-71 (1986) (noting that the EEOC's brief as amicus curiae
directly contradicted its own guidelines).
265. See Manemann, supra note 14, at 648-49 nn.255, 258 (quoting Richard Posner,
What Am I? A Potted Plant? The Case Against Strict Constructionism, NEW REPUB-
uc, Sept. 28, 1987, at 23).
266. See supra notes 157-72 and accompanying text (describing the EEOC's 1990
policy statement disallowing sexual favoritism claims under Title VII).
267. See supra notes 77-88 and accompanying text (discussing Meritor).
268. See supra notes 163-82 and infra notes 269-81 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing the potential liberalism of EEOC guidelines).
269. See supra notes 173-82 and accompanying text for a discussion of the 1991
amendment to Title VII.
270. See Phillips, supra note 5, at 569 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (Supp. III
1991)).
271. See supra notes 209-15 and accompanying text (discussing why § 703(m) does
not support sexual favoritism claims).
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lawfully motivated desire to help an incompetent white person when
the employer has also made it clear that whites will always be hired
over non-whites. The discrimination coin is two-sided, and merely
choosing to look at the beneficiary's side does not eliminate the victim's
side. Because the test for unlawful discrimination is a motivating factor
test instead of a but-for test,272 sexual favoritism claims should be
more readily recognized by the courts.
7. Sexual Favoritism Has Coercive Effects
The DeCintio court claimed that the submission to language within
the EEOC guidelines on sexual harassment and sexual favoritism re-
quires the employer to make coercive sexual demands upon an employ-
ee before liability attaches to the act. 3 This holding, however, over-
looks the supplemental information accompanying the final amend-
ments to the EEOC guidelines, which uses the words "'granting sexual
favors to their mutual supervisor"' when referring to cognizable actions
under Title VII. 7 It can just as easily be argued that granting does not
imply coercion."5
Even if some level of coercion is required, the average case of sexual
favoritism still meets this requirement.276 Whether an employer de-
mands sex from an employee as a precondition to a promotion or the
employer merely promotes his consensual paramour, all better qualified
employees passed over for promotion receive the same message: they
must "'use' or 'surrender' [their] sexuality" in order to be promoted.2"
Even the advantaged paramour is arguably under some level of coer-
cion. One feminist theory states that all sexual affairs between supervi-
sors and subordinates are "inherently coercive "2 8 or, at best, "inher-
ently suspect."2 At least one circuit court has accepted this theory of
272. See supra notes 173-81 and accompanying text (discussing the rejection of a
but-for test).
273. See DeCintio v. Westchester County Med. Ctr., 807 F.2d 304, 307-08 (2d Cir.
1986) (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(g) (1986)).
274. See Van Tol, supra note 5, at 179-80 (quoting 45 Fed. Reg. 74,676-77 (1980)).
275. See id. at 180.
276. See id. at 178-79.
277. See id. (citing Chamallas, supra note 171, at 856).
278. See Van Tol, supra note 5, at 160 n.27.
279. See Phyllis Coleman, Sex in Power Dependency Relationships: Taking Unfair
Advantage of the "Fair" Sex, 53 ALB. L. REV. 95, 96 (1988). Coleman asserts that "an
employee states a prima facie case when she alleges a sexual relationship com-
inequitable power relationships. In Snider v. Consolidation Coal
Co.,' the Seventh Circuit held in favor of a Title VII plaintiff in a sex-
ual harassment case by relying heavily upon the testimony of an expert
witness who claimed that a sexual relationship between a supervisor
and a subordinate could never "be truly consensual and voluntary" and
that over ninety-five percent of the victims of coerced sexual relation-
ships never complain nor "report the problem due to a fear of reprisal
or loss of privacy.
"18
8. Sexual Favoritism is not Analogous to Nepotism
The fallacy of comparing cases of nepotism to sexual favoritism is
somewhat obvious. Kinship is largely an accident of birth, whereas
paramour selection is not. Employees cannot make their lineage avail-
able to an employer, but employees can make their sexuality available
to the employer. It is this mutable element that underlies sexual favor-
itism and makes it so repugnant to its victims.
9. Sexual Favoritism is a Sufficiently Immoral Act
There is some merit to the consequentialist's argument "that sexual
favoritism is morally indistinguishable from the types of discrimination
that Title VII clearly does proscribe."2 2 From an injury-in-fact perspec-
tive, however, the qualified employee who was denied a job benefit
does not care whether the unqualified employee who got the job benefit
consented to or was coerced into a sexual affair. Even if the motiva-
tions behind sexual favoritism and the consequences of sexual favorit-
ism are morally distinguishable from other acts of sexual discrimina-
tion, there is an inherent immorality in dismissing a sexual favoritism
claim because of the fatalist or apologist viewpoint that it is impossible
to eliminate all forms of employment discrimination.2" When courts
menced during an employer-employee relationship." Id. at 137.
280. 973 F.2d 555 (7th Cir. 1992).
281. See id. at 558-60. In Snider, a male superintendent denied coercing a sexual
relationship from Snider, although he admitted to having consensual sex with nine of
his seventeen female employee subordinates. See id. at 557.
282. See Phillips, supra note 5, at 573-74; supra notes 223-24 and accompanying
text (discussing the consequentialist's view).
283. For the same reason, the slippery-slope argument against recognizing sexual
favoritism is also weak. Whether recognizing sexual favoritism would necessarily open
the door to other types of sex-based discrimination claims such as those brought by
homosexuals, transsexuals, or effeminate men is unknown. However, some of these
questions and even the viability of sexual favoritism claims themselves might have
been obliquely answered in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 118 S. Ct.
998 (1998). In Oncale, the Court noted that "male-on-male sexual harassment in the
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turn a blind eye to obvious victims of an employer's arbitrary criteria
for providing job benefits to unqualified persons, the public's faith in
the law and judiciary is shaken.
10. Sexual Favoritism is Actionable "Sex-Plus" Discrimination
Sex-plus discrimination is based upon the theory that employers "can
legally discriminate on the basis of gender plus other factors," but only
in a very limited way.' For example, courts have upheld employers'
rules that require men to have short hair but allow women to keep
theirs longs or that say only men must wear ties on the job.2"6 On
the other hand, courts have denied employers the right to establish
maximum weight requirements for female flight attendants 7 or to
prohibit female flight attendants from wearing glasses.2 What sepa-
rates the hair cases from the weight cases is the level of sex appeal be-
ing forcibly interjected into job descriptions. Sex appeal is the driving
factor in the weight and eyeglasses cases.2" As in the weight and eye-
glass cases, sexual favoritism cases are based upon otherwise qualified
employees being denied job benefits because they fail to generate the
requisite sex appeal. Sexual favoritism, therefore, should also be recog-
nized as unlawful sex-plus discrimination.2n°
workplace was assuredly not the principle evil Congress was concerned with when it
enacted Title VII. But statutory prohibitions often go beyond the principle evil to
cover reasonably comparable evils ... sexual harassment must extend to sexual
harassment of any kind that meets the statutory requirement." Id. at 1002.
284. See Manemann, supra note 14, at 643-44.
285. See Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publ'g Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1092-93 (5th Cir. 1975)
(en banc).
286. See Fountain v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 555 F.2d 753, 755-56 (9th Cir. 1977). For
other examples of legitimate sex-plus discrimination cases, see Manemann, supra note
14, at 644 n.235.
287. See Gerdom v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 692 F.2d 602, 610 (9th Cir. 1982).
288. See Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 366 F. Supp. 763, 790 (D.D.C. 1973), affd
in part and vacated on other grounds, 567 F.2d 429, 437 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (affirming
the district court's finding of statutory infringement under Title VII).
289. See, e.g., Gerdom, 692 F.2d at 604. In Gerdom, Continental Airlines gladly ad-
mitted as much by disclosing that the height to weight ratios were designed "to cre-
ate the public image of an airline which offered passengers service by thin, attractive
women, whom executives referred to as Continental's 'girls.'" See id. Continental did
not even offer the pretense that the weight restrictions on its "girls" were necessary
from an ergonomics or other physical capacity standpoint. See id.
290. See PLAYER, supra note 14, § 5.25(d)(2), at 251 & n.68 (noting that sexual
favoritism cases discriminate based upon gender plus either an employee's consent to
C. Summary of Positions
For each argument against the recognition of sexual favoritism as a
cause of action, there is Supreme Court and lower court precedent;
federal statutory and regulations language; or scholarly commentary
rebutting the negative arguments. Any question regarding the practical
enforceability of a sexual favoritism claim can be eliminated by the
adoption of a clear set of elements that identifies only injurious and
discriminatory cases of sexual favoritism and does not reach innocuous
office romances. Creating such a cause of action is relatively simple
and does not involve using any standards of review not already used by
the courts in discrimination cases.
VI. A PROPOSED CAUSE OF ACTION FOR SEXUAL FAVORITISM CASES
In order to be actionable, sexual favoritism claims should establish,
by a preponderance of the evidence, the four elements of a prima facie
case of disparate treatment discrimination as set out in McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green.29' These elements are: (1) membership in a
protected class; (2) the plaintiff applied for and was qualified for the
employment job offered;292 (3) the employer rejected the plaintiff; and
(4) other applicants with the same or lesser qualifications subsequently
were considered for or received the benefit offered.2' These elements
have some flexibility and can be modified to fit the facts of each
case.
294
a sexual relationship or the employee's sex appeal and as such provide grounds for a
sex-plus discrimination suit).
291. 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
292. Some circuit courts have held that a victim of a traditional quid pro quo sexu-
al harassment claim must prove a tangible loss in job benefits in order to prevail.
See Paul, supra note 22, at 340-41; Phillips, supra note 5, at 554 & n.38 (citing post-
Meritor cases from the Second and Seventh Circuits). The split among circuits will
be decided by the Supreme Court in 1998. See Jansen v. Packaging Corp. of Am.,
123 F.3d 490 (7th Cir. 1997) (en banc), cert. granted sub nom., Burlington Indus.,
Inc., 118 S. Ct. 876 (Jan. 23, 1998) (97-569). However, when sexual harassment is
based upon a hostile work environment theory, the victim need not prove a loss of
tangible job benefits. See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64-65 (1986). In
hostile work environment cases, the Court also ruled that the plaintiff need not suffer
actual psychological harm but perceive as a "reasonable person" would that the work
environment was abusive. See Harris v. Forklift Sys. Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22 (1993); see
also Meritor, 477 U.S. at 66-67. This Comment's suggested form of actionable sexual
favoritism is based upon injuries that are akin to quid pro quo claims where a tangi-
ble economic benefit must be lost or denied.
293. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; Manemann, supra note 14, at 617.
294. See United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 715
(1983); Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253-54 n.6 (1980);
McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802 n.13.
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Plaintiffs always have a gender and are presumed to be injured in
sexual favoritism cases because of an employer's gender-based action.
This Comment, therefore, assumes that men and women always qualify
as being part of a protected class when discussing sexual favoritism.
The second through fourth elements are completely consistent with
sexual favoritism cases. These elements, however, are not always met
by the plaintiffs. For example, the Ninth Circuit, in Candelore v. Clark
County Sanitation District,295 noted that even though a younger
woman might have been having a sexual affair with Ms. Candelore's
supervisors, Candelore was not qualified for, nor applied for any of the
benefits conferred upon the younger woman.296
Within the prima facie framework, causation is the plaintiff's major
obstacle. Assuming Title VII sex discrimination claims necessitate a
gender-based action by the employer leading to a disparate treatment of
an employee, sexual favoritism claims can still meet this causal element
by using the motivating factor test added to Title VII in 1991.297 There
are three basic prongs that I propose will help prove that sex-based
considerations motivated the employer. The first prong is that the plain-
tiff must show that a sexual relationship existed between the beneficia-
ry and the supervisor or employer.29 As the King court noted, this re-
lationship need not involve sexual intercourse to be a sexual relation-
ship upon which favoritism is based.2"
The second prong of the motivating factor (causation) test is that the
plaintiff must show that the supervisor was capable of, or instrumental
in, conferring the benefits in question.3" Obviously, if a supervisor is
295. 975 F.2d 588 (9th Cir. 1992).
296. See id. at 590-91 (holding that "[blecause Candelore failed to identify employ-
ment benefits or opportunities that she was entitled to but did not receive, she has
not stated a prima facie case of discrimination under Title VII").
297. See supra notes 173-82 and accompanying text for an analysis of this amend-
ment as codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (1995).
298. See King v. Palmer, 778 F.2d 878, 881-82 (D.C. Cir. 1985). The plaintiff can rely
upon circumstantial evidence alone when proving the discriminatory intent. See
Aikens, 460 U.S. at 714 n.3; International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S.
324, 358 n.44 (1977).
299. See King, 778 F.2d at 882.
300. This prong is often noticed by courts. See, e.g., id. at 821 n.4, 882 (emphasiz-
ing that the direct influence of the supervisor on his paramour's promotion was a
key element in proving a violation of Title VI); Ayers v. AT&T Co., 826 F.Supp. 443,
446 (S.D. Fla. 1993) (holding that in, order for a Title VII sexual harassment claim
under a quid pro quo theory to apply, there must be a supervisor or employee capa-
ble of affecting the plaintiffs job status).
powerless in terms of influencing promotions or other benefits, the
causation factor is not met. An office romance between equals or be-
tween people that are incapable of conferring job benefits upon each
other is not actionable under a sexual favoritism claim.
The third prong of the motivating-factor test is a showing that the
beneficiary of the alleged sexual favoritism was no more qualified for
the benefit received than was the plaintiff."1 This third prong is really
the fourth element of the prima facie case. In Candelore, the female
employee who was unqualified to receive the benefits in question also
failed to offer any evidence that the alleged beneficiary was unqualified
for the benefits received. 2 As upset as the female employee was
about "the isolated incidents of sexual horseplay ... [that] took place
over a period of years," such concerns had potential to be addressed
only through a sexual harassment claim under a hostile work environ-
ment theory, and not as a sexual favoritism claim.0
While the motivating factor test might be viewed as a low causal
threshold, it is really a highly set bar to spurious suits that could injure
innocuous office romances. Further, this test is consistent with Su-
preme Court precedent that allows employers some element of personal
bias not based upon sex if the applicants' qualifications are otherwise
objectively equal."°
Should the plaintiff meet the required burdens described above, the
plaintiff will have demonstrated a sexual favoritism claim deserving of a
remedy. The remedies should be consistent with other Title VII reme-
dies, and therefore be adaptable to the factual settings of the case.00
301. See Manemann, supra note 14, at 658-61.
302. See Candelore v. Clark County Sanitation Dist., 975 F.2d 588, 590 (9th Cir.
1992).
303. See id.
304. See Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 259 (1980)
(noting that the only restriction upon an employer's personal bias among equally
qualified individuals is that the bias cannot be based upon unlawful criteria). This
Comment suggests that sexual favoritism is not an unlawful criteria unless the benefi-
ciary is unqualified whereas the plaintiff is qualified.
305. For an example of the remedies available in a sexual favoritism case, see
King, 778 F.2d at 882-83 n.7.
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VII. EMPLOYER LIABILITY FOR SEXUAL FAVORITISM AND
SEXUAL HARASSMENT CLAIMS AND HOW TO AVOID THEM
A. Employers' Liability
Even if sexual favoritism is not recognized as an actionable form of
sex discrimination, a romantic relationship "between a supervisor and
subordinate may quickly turn from 'consensual' to 'harassment' on noth-
ing more than the say-so of one of the participants, leaving the employ-
er to suffer the consequences. "a" Even if a plaintiffs case is weak, art-
ful pleading by victims of sexual favoritism can skirt around the
DeCintio line of cases and can force employers to defend themselves in
sexual harassment suits that create bad publicity and cause morale
problems at the office." 7 To lay the foundation for a hostile work en-
vironment theory or implied quid pro quo claim, a plaintiff must only
allege that the sexual favoritism was not a singular event or that the
relationship was not purely consensual." For example, in Trautvetter
v. Quick,' a male school principal had a consensual sexual affair
with one of his female teachers, a relationship the teacher herself "ac-
tively pursued."310 Despite these facts, the teacher brought a sexual
harassment suit under Title VII and appealed the summary judgment
against her to the circuit court.3 ' The principal and school district ul-
timately "prevailed, but after much litigation and no little embarrass-
ment. 0
12
306. See Casey & Tuschman, supra note 6, at 53.
"While he was on the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, Judge Bork, joined by
Scalia and Starr, made this very point. In the same case which the Supreme
Court ultimately decided as the landmark sexual harassment case of Meritor
Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986) .... Judge Bork wrote: 'sexual
dalliance, however voluntarily engaged in, becomes harassment whenever an
employee sees fit, after the fact, so to characterize it.'"
Id. at 54 (quoting Vinson v. Taylor, 753 F.2d 141 (D.C. Cir.), reh'g denied, 760 F.2d
1330 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Bork, Scalia, and Starr, J., dissenting)).
307. See id. at 54 n.14 (citing Dirksen v. City of Springfield, 842 F. Supp. 1117,
1122 (C.D. III. 1994)).
308. See supra notes 159-72 and accompanying text (discussing EEOC guidelines for
valid sex discrimination claims).
309. 916 F.2d 1140 (7th Cir. 1990).
310. See id. at 114246, 1154.
311. See id. at 1141-42.
312. See Casey & Tuschman, supra note 6, at 52-55.
Embarrassment to employers arises not only because of claims by
subordinates. In December 1997, only nine days before the highly antici-
pated public opening of the much acclaimed Getty Museum in
Brentwood, California, the public caught wind of the dirty laundry once
closeted by the museum staff. 3 The curator of drawings, a married
man, filed a sexual harassment and discrimination suit when a female
subordinate threatened to ruin him for ending his affair with her."1 4
The curator further claimed that his two female supervisors rejected his
complaints and instructed him to give his ex-lover favorable perfor-
mance evaluations."5 Surely, the Getty Museum would have preferred
its opening day press to be about other events.
If bad press and high litigation costs are not enough to encourage
employers to consider implementing anti-sexual favoritism and harass-
ment programs, the possibly exorbitant legal liability should be. The
Civil Rights Act of 1991 which amended Title VII added remedies for
intentional sex discrimination by providing for jury trials, expert wit-
ness fees, and punitive damages." 6 These penalties, coupled with oth-
er Title VII penalties, can lead to large awards for plaintiffs and their
attorneys in sexual harassment claims. For example, in November 1995,
Janet Dumas was ordered reinstated with accrued benefits, and Tyson
Foods, Inc. was ordered to pay $69,000 in compensatory damages plus
$8,000,000 in punitives 7 Further, the court enjoined Tyson Foods and
all of its officers, agents, supervisors and employees "from maintaining
the existence of a sexually hostile work environment for the female
employees of the Blountsville plant."" ' According to some commenta-
tors, this single incident is part of a larger trend of high-priced damage
awards for sexual harassment. 31 9
The Court in Meitor Savings Bank v. Vinson32 held that employ-
ers might be held vicariously liable for their supervisors' acts even if
the employer did not have actual notice of the alleged events and the
plaintiff suffered no economic harm.32' It is this added uncertainty for




316. See Casey & Tuschman, supra note 6, at 53, 56 n.1 (citing Civil Rights Act of
1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, §§ 102, 113, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991) (codified in part at 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1995)).
317. See Goldstein, supra note 153, at 105 (citing Dumas v. Tyson Foods, Inc., Civil
Action No. 93-C-2688-W (N.D. Ala. 1995)).
318. Id.
319. See id. (citing Christine Whitesell Lewis et al., The Tort of Outrage in Ala-
bama: Emerging Trends in Sexual Harassment, 55 ALA. LAw. 33 (1994)).
320. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
321. See id. at 68-73.
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employers that makes their position even more precarious. Not surpris-
ingly, risk management becomes a factor, and insurance companies
have found sexual harassment insurance a lucrative business. 2 Such,
insurance is the fastest growing kind of insurance coverage in the Unit-
ed States in the 1990s with many companies spending up to $100,000
per year on it. 23
B. How Employers can Avoid Liability
As is clear from the above, sexual favoritism should be discouraged
because it invites a multitude of legal and business problems for em-
ployers.324 Although employers can sometimes insulate themselves
from legal damages by purchasing insurance policies, employers still
have an incentive to avoid liability altogether.2
The EEOC guidelines for sexual harassment claims identify ways in
which an employer can limit liability for the acts of its employees and
supervisors.326 In general, these guidelines and the courts' interpreta-
tions of them recommend that an employer "(1) implement a written
sexual harassment policy that encourages meritorious claims; (2)
promptly and effectively investigate all claims;" (3) remedy all prob-
lems; and (4) monitor subsequent events to confirm that the remedy is
effective. 27 Employers fail to meet these four requirements the follow-
322. See More Firms Insuring for Harassment, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 24, 1998, at DI.
323. See id.
324. See Casey & Tuschman, supra note 6, at 55; Rachael A. Hetherington & Barba-
ra Childs Wallace, Recent Developments in Sexual Harassment Law, 13 Miss. C. L.
REV. 37, 84 (1992).
325. Not all legal liability is insurable. Generally, intentional torts are excluded from
liability coverage either under the policy itself or as a matter of public policy estab-
lished by the courts. See KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, INSURANCE LAW AND REGULATION: CAS-
ES AND MATERIAIS 87-88 (2d ed. 1995). Some states, including California, as a matter
of public policy, also preclude insurers from paying an insured's punitive damages
regardless of what the insurance contract purports to cover. See id. at 75-88.
326. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(d)-(f) (1997). An employer can avoid liability for con-
duct between its employees if "it can show that it took immediate and appropriate
corrective action." 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(d). Employers "should take all steps necessary
to prevent sexual harassment from occurring, such as affirmatively raising the subject,
expressing strong disapproval, developing appropriate sanctions, informing employees
of their right to raise and how to raise the issue of harassment under tite VII." 29
C.F.R. § 1604.11(f).
327. See Potts v. BE & K Constr. Co., 604 So. 2d 398 (Ala. 1992); Cooper, supra
note 78, at 24; Goldstein, supra note 153, at 108-09 (citing Steele v. Offshore Ship-
building, Inc., 867 F.2d 1311, 1316 (11th Cir. 1989); Hetherington & Wallace, supra
ing ways: making unfulfilled promises to investigate, demoting the vic-
tim, advising that a slander suit could result from the complaint,3' ad-
vising the complainant to "'tell [the harasser] you have herpes,"'' and
advising the complainant to avoid notifying the EEOC.'
Although the dos and especially the do nots of creating and abiding
by an effective anti-sexual harassment policy may seem obvious, one
easy way to ensure that sexual favoritism claims do not get raised or
turn into sexual harassment cases is to institute no-dating policies
among employees. Judicial precedent supports allowing employers to
enforce no-dating policies, especially as between supervisors and subor-
dinates. 1 Such prohibitions, however, must be uniformly enforced. In
Zentiska v. Pooler Motel, Ltd.," the defendant employer lost a sexual
discrimination case when it was revealed that the area director who
was involved with hiring and firing decisions was not terminated when
he dated and eventually married an employee.' Of course, no-dating
policies should be part of a larger anti-sexual harassment policy.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
For some, recognizing sexual favoritism as a valid cause of action
under Title VII would be like "launching a missile to kill a mouse." '
note 324, at 85-89); Joe A. Simmons, Sexual Harassment-Prophylactic Measures, 19
OHIO N.U. L. REV. 661, 666-68 (1993).
328. See Cooper, supra note 78, at 24 n.119 (citing Cortes v. Maxus Exploration
Co., 977 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1992)).
329. Id. (quoting Brooms v. Regal Tube Co., 881 F.2d 412 (7th Cir. 1989)).
330. See id. (citing Yates v. Avco Corp., 819 F.2d 630 (6th Cir. 1987)).
331. See, e.g., Casey & Tuschman, supra note 6, at 55, 56 n.29 (citing Sarsha v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 3 F.3d 1035, 1042 (7th Cir. 1993)). In Sarsha, the court held
that Sears was allowed "to enforce a no-dating policy ... against supervisors, who
by virtue of their managerial positions are expected to know better . . . ." Sarsha, 3
F.3d at 1042. But see Pasch v. Katz Media Corp., No. 94 Civ. 8554 (RPP), 1995 WL
469710 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 8, 1995) (holding that New York Labor Law section 201-d pro-
hibits employers from enforcing no-dating rules because dating is a "legal recreational
activity"); Seth Howard Borden, Note, Love's Labor Law: Establishing a Uniform
Interpretation of New York's "Legal Recreational Activities" Law to Allow Employers
to Enforce No-Dating Policies, 62 BROOK. L. REV. 353, 353-55 (1996).
332. 708 F. Supp. 1321 (S.D. Ga. 1988).
333. See id. at 1322-23, 1325. Of added interest is that the female employee plaintiff
was initially terminated for dating her manager even though the manager was aware
of the no-dating policy and the female employee was never informed of the policy.
See id. at 1323. Such results are all-too-common. As one researcher found, when such
drastic actions as termination are taken, "females were twice as likely to be termi-
nated as males." See Van Tol, supra note 5, at 166 & n.57 (citing Quinn, supra note
5, at 50). In Zentiska, however, the female was quickly rehired and the manager was
later terminated for his relationship with the plaintiff, whom he eventually married.
See Zentiska, 708 F. Supp. at 1323, 1325.
334. With apologies for borrowing Justice Blackmun's now-famous dissent in Lucas
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Maldng sexual favoritism cases actionable would also provide the slip-
pery slope for other supposedly less egregious forms of discrimination
to enter the courtroom.3 These arguments, however, merely cloud
the true issues.
In this age of anti-affirmative action, most people (at least in Califor-
nia)a' believe it is wrong to grant preferential treatment to less quali-
fied applicants on the arbitrary basis of race, sex, ethnicity, or national
origin. 7 If this concern about the less-qualified applicant is to be con-
sistently applied, then the courts and legislatures should extend the
principle to cases where the different, but no less provocative, arbitrary
criteria of sexual preferences and performances control job opportuni-
ties. Admittedly, it may be easier from an evidentiary standpoint to
identify cases where less qualified non-whites are the beneficiaries of
employer preferences than it is to spot cases where less qualified lovers
get the job; but the injuries to the qualified applicants are exactly the
same in both situations. Further, when comparing the beneficiaries of
sexual favoritism to the beneficiaries of an affirmative action program,
it can be argued easily that less social good is achieved by promoting
the paramour instead of the non-white.
Courts and the EEOC have already admitted that sexual favoritism is
an unfair form of discrimination even though they have yet to make it
actionable.a' This is an irony that needs fixing, and courts have the
v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1036 (1992) (Blackmun, J., dissent-
ing) (noting that in its majority decision on Fifth Amendment takings standards, "the
Court launches a missile to kill a mouse").
335. See supra notes 199-201 and accompanying text (discussing Congress's failure
to expand VII to "affectional or sexual orientation" cases); supra notes 232-34 and
accompanying text (discussing the possibility of "transexuality" or even "appearance"
claims).
336. California citizens voted in favor of a statewide anti-affirmative action proposal
called the California Civil Rights Initiative (Proposition 209), Assembly Constitutional
Amendment No. 2, 1995-96 Reg. Sess. (1994). See Allen R. Kamp, Anti-Preference in
Employment Law: A Preliminary Analysis, 18 CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 59, 59 n.1
(1996). California governor Pete Wilson, in signing an executive order ending affirma-
tive action for female and minority business owners seeking state contracts, said:
"'From now on, the state will award contracts . . . based solely on the basis of mer-
it.'" See Jenifer Warren, Wilson Abolishes Affirmative Action in State Contracts, L.A.
TIMES, Mar. 12, 1998, at Al.
337. See CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 31(a) (West 1997).
338. See supra notes 7, 145 and accompanying text (noting that courts have not
recognized sexual favoritism claims as actionable while simultaneously recognizing its
unfairness).
authority to do such fixing." ° Ignoring sexual favoritism claims results
largely in perpetuating female stereotypes in the workplace at the ex-
pense of qualified candidates of both genders, thereby destroying the
very concept Title VII was intended to secure-equality in the
workplace for equal job skills.' Courts should recognize sexual favor-
itism for what it is: improper and actionable sex discrimination.
MITCHELL POOLE
339. See supra notes 68, 259-68, 283 and accompanying text (discussing the courts'
ability to construe Title VII broadly).
340. See, e.g., Chamallas, supra note 171, at 856-57; Van Tol, supra note 5, at 181-
82 (noting that "[tihe use of a sexual standard focuses on employees' sexuality rather
than their abilities; it devalues the worker's real worth, fosters resentment towards
women, and reinforces the insidious stereotypical notion that women can 'sleep their
way to the top"').
